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INTRODUCTION
THE ROCKS AND SHOALS.
Will she shun the rocks and shoals upon which her
sister made shipwreck and perished? Or will her
firm hand and strong will lead on in safety the
rich argosy with which the nation is about to
entrust her. until with a spreading sail it
reaches the mid ocean of its prosperity?l
On November 17. 1558 it appeared that the argosy
of England had in fact been shipwrecked and the
and shoals

11

11

rocks

surrounding her greatly reduced the possibility

that she would ever spread her sails again.

At war with

France, she was both militarily weak and financially
exhausted.

Ravaged by recent years of religious

persecution she faced the prospect of a rejuvenated
Catholic church on the continent and Calvinist impatience
at home.

She was threatened by France in Scotland and by

the impending loss of her only ally in Europe, as France
and Spain negotiated a marriage agreement.

Finally, to

captain the argosy. she now had a monarch of questionable
legitimacy and a woman.
indeed.

The situation appeared grim

Yet with skillful navigation and the aid of a

proficient crew. the argosy did emerge, after a voyage
1 Joseph Stevenson, ed., Great Britain, Public Record
Office, Calendar of State Pa ers, Forei n Series, of the
Reign ofElizabeth, Vol. I Washington: Microcard Editions,
1964), p. lxxv.
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of some twenty years, into that

11

mid ocean of its

prosperity," and a strong and stable Elizabethan England
prepared to spread its sails and enter its most glorious
age.

*

*

*

On ascending the throne, Elizabeth inherited many
problems, the most pressing of which was a war between
France and Spain in which Mary, as the wife of the Spanish
king, had become involved.

From the beginning of the reign,

therefore, the French were considered England's major
adversary, and relations between these two nations played
a dominant role in the formation of Elizabethan foreign
policy.
Traditionally, England had maintained strong ties
with the Hapsburg powers, and Mary's marriage to Philip II
had reduced her almost to the realm of a Spanish dependency.
Despite a so called "diplomatic revolution" in 1572 which
saw England and France allied in the Treaty of Blois,
throughout most of the period from 1558 - 1584 there was
a marked preference for the Spanish alliance and France
remained suspect.
There were good reasons for this.

Apart from the

strong trade connections which bound England to Spain,
the situation in France and her policy during the early
years of the reign did little to encourage English
friendship.

In 1558 Henry II was king, but his death the

3

following year left France a victim of intrigue and
strife characterized by religious wars which plagued the
country for the rest of the century.

Three factions

competed for political ascendancy while Catherine de
Medici, determined to hold the strings of power for her
ineffective sons, vacillated.

Anglo-French relations,

therefore, were extremely complicated, since they
depended upon which of these factions was predominant at
the French court.

They also made manifest a marked distrust

of France in general, since it was well known that even
with the pro-English faction supporting an alliance, tts
opponents were always waiting in the wings intriguing
with her enemies.
The most powerful faction at the beginning of this
period was led by the Duke of Guise.

Ultra-Catholic, it
was the foremost champion of the Counter Reformation 2
and schemed constantly with the Pope and Philip II for
the extermination of heresy.

The Duke's sister, Mary of
Lorraine, had married James V of Scotland 3 giving the Guise
family a personal interest in Scottish affairs as well as a
concern for the well-being of their niece, Mary Stuart.
The Guises were involved in most of the plots in her favour
and recognized her as the rightful Queen of England.
2G. R. Elton. England Under the Tudors (London:
Methuen and Company, 1971), p. 278.
3
Appendix A.

They

4

favoured alliance with Spain and aggressive policy against
Elizabeth4 who was therfore always watchful of them.
Their strength was an influential element in determining
her policy.
At the other end of the French political spectrum
were the Huguenots.

Zealous Protestants they were led

initially by Conde and Coligny and ultimately by Henry of
Navarre.5

They aimed to convert France to Protestantism

and could usually be depended upon to exert their influence
in favour of England at the French court. 6 Although
opposed to Spain and advocating support for the Dutch
rebels against Philip, they were sufficiently nationalistic
that they would unite with the Catholics to expel a
foreign threat.

This was clearly shown during the

religious war of 1562 when Catherine de Medici managed
to bring about a coalition to expel the English.

Elizabeth,

who had entered the war reluctantly at the request of the
Huguenots, never forgot their defection, and remained
wary of their appeals for aid in the future.
Between these two extremes was a group of
moderate Catholics represented by the Montmorencis, which
aimed at a policy of compromise and mutual toleration in
France.

These politigues, as they came to be called,

4 conyers Read, Mr. Secretarl Walsingham and the
Policy of Queen Elizabeth, Vol. I Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1925), p. 87.
5 rbid., p. 85.
6
Ibid., p. 86.
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wanted peace at home but were not averse to diverting
their more turbulent elements into foreign wars against
the Hapsburgs.7
Attempting to balance these factions was
Catherine de Medici.

The widow of Henry II she had four

sons and was determined to preserve and dominate their
rule.

She was the central figure in French politics

from 1560 - 1589.

Angered at Guise domination of Francis II

she was prepared to discredit their pro-Spanish foreign
policy and move toward an English alliance in the early
1570's.

Forced to strengthen the Huguenots to accomplish

this, however, she soon became alarmed at their increasing
influence over Charles IX and engineered the atrocities of
St. Bartholomew's Massacre.
French friendship, therefore, was a thing to be
treated with caution.

Its major value to Elizabeth was as

a lever against Spain, but she never fully trusted it.
and her policy did not depend on it.

Even though

continual civil war rendered France almost impotent in
the international arena. as Elizabeth turned to solve the
problems of her reign. her acts were always carried out
with a watchful eye toward her ancient enemy.
In 1558, although her situation seemed desperate,
Elizabeth did have one friend on whom she could depend.
The old Burgundian alliance had firm roots in trade

6

connections, and despite Elizabeth s questionable
1

claim to the throne and suspected Protestantism Philip
was still prepared to protect her.

Although apparent

Franco-Spanish friendship at the Cateau-Cambresis
negotiations might have made it seem otherwise, given
a choice of England under Elizabeth or under
Mary Stuart Philip had no doubts as to whom was
preferable.

A union of France, England and Scotland would

have been disastrous to Spain, especially in the Netherlands. 8
Philip was determined to prevent such a catastrophe and
Elizabeth was reasonably certain that she could rely on
his support.

Eager to disentangle herself from an

intolerable situation, she was careful not to alienate
Philip through any immediate anti-Catholic religious
commitment. 9 Gradually, as she gained in strength,
however, she needed to rely less and less on her Spanish
patron.

Throughout the years until the 1580 s a slow
1

deterioration of this friendship can be traced.

By

manipulating the age-old Hapsburg-Valois rivalry
Elizabeth was eventually able to pursue an independent
course based on neither French nor Spanish amity but on
England's national interest. 10
8 conyers Read. Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen
Elizabeth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 164-165.
9c.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. II, p. xxii.
10 R. B. Wernham. Be f ore the Armada, the Growth of
English Foreign Policy: 1485-1588 (London: The Trinity
Press, 1966), p. 241.
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The demise of Anglo-Spanish friendship and the
consequent increase in English independence was
certainly succoured by the religious situation.

The mid-

sixteenth century saw Europe divided into two antagonistic
and irreconcilable camps.

Calvinism had appeared in the

forefront of militant Protestantism with an international
character never acquired by Lutheranism. 11 The
Catholics, meanwhile, emerged from the Council of Trent
equally inflexible and determined to launch an assault
on their religious enemies. 12 Each group, fearing a
league or conspiracy from the other, resolved to work
through secular powers wherever possible to thwart its
adversary.
Under these circumstances Elizabeth's position was
extremely awkward.

Hailed as their champion by

Protestants and considered an enemy and usurper by
Catholics she was forced to tread very carefully.

While

the negotiations were sti11 in progress at CateauCambresis she was not anxious to disclose her religious
policy for fear of alienating Philip.

His impending

marriage to Elizabeth of Valois had reinforced the fears
of a Catholic league 13 and Elizabeth was compelled to
11 rbid., p. 242.
12
R. B. Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and
Price Revolution, Vol. III of New Cambridge Modern History
(Cambridge: University Press, 1968), p. 156.
13Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 33.
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restrain impatient Puritans in her parliament.

The

treaty concluded, however, and her seat on the throne
of England ever more secure, she gradually allowed her
religious settlement to unfold.
Even before her course was officially determined
exiles from the Marian persecution had flowed back into
14
England. ~ From the beginning, therefore, she was faced
with a strong Puritan element in parliament which was
determined to place her firmly in the Protestant camp.

l5

Not eager to precipitate a Catholic crusade from Europe
or alienate loyal English Catholics Elizabeth remained
cautious, and her religious policy normally depended upon
the international situation.
By 1559 she was prepared to yield to the Commons
allowing passage of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity.
Although not as radical as some would have liked, these
laws asserted England's independence of Rome and restored
16
the Edwardian Prayer Book of 1552.
Apart from a
watchful observation of English Catholics, however, she
was not willing to initiate any form of persecution in
the hope that her settlement would be broad enough to
encourage their compliance.

In international affairs

Elizabeth was continually subjected to appeals for aid
14
Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy
(Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1964), p. 166.
15

16

Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 266.
Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 246.

9

from Huguenots in France and Protestants in Scotland and
the Netherlands.

But despite pressure from her council,

she was loathe to repeat the errors of her French
campaign and, after 1564, confined herself to
underhand efforts to maintain the Protestant cause in
these areas.

She was determined not to commit herself

to any official interference which might encourage an
17
anti-English crusade by Catholics.
By 1570 it appeared that her policy had been
largely successful and that most Englishmen were by now
Anglicans.

Elizabeth was reasonably certain that a

foreign invasion would be necessary to restore
Catholicism, and the lack of adequate support for the
Northern Rebellion convinced her that most remaining
English Catholics were too

nation~listdc

to

18

support~one.

Since both France and Spain were by now hampered by
insurrection it was also unlikely that they could mount
such an invasion.
Her moderation, however, was destined to destruction
by fanaticism from both sides.

In 1570 Pope Pius V issued

his Bull of excommunication tantamount to a declaration
of war against Elizabeth.
17
18

19

The Papacy now embarked on

Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 273.
Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 337.

19 Ibid., p. 339.

l0

a campaign aimed to oust the heretic.

Making use of

anarchy in Ireland, unrest in Scotland, Mary Stuart's
imprisonment, and any other available opportunities, a
series of plots was launched designed to restore
Catholicism in England. In addition, after the founding
of Douai in 1568 20 a flood of Jesuit missionaries
poured into the country to re-awaken the English
Catholics and recruit them for this cause.
The listless Catholics, ignored for so long by
international forces, were now faced with a decision.
Absolved from their obedience to their monarch they could
no longer slumber behind the facade of nationalism.
Suspicion of their involvement in the various plots
against Elizabeth had sparked a new wave of Puritan
agitation in the Commons.

Elizabeth was forced eventually

to give in.

Faced with the threat of revived Catholicism
21
she could not afford to alienate her Protestant allies.
Fines for recusants were increased in 1571 and again in
22
the 1580's.
Although she still preferred a milder
policy toward Catholics at home, those entering from the
continent were often apprehended as traitors. 23
20

Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 305.

21 conyers Read, The Tudors: Personalities and
Practical Politics in Sixteenth Century England (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 195.
22 Read, l~alsingham, Vol. II, p. 286.
23Ibid., p. 272.
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Catholic plots from abroad were invariably
supported by the Guise faction in France and often by
Philip's governors in the Netherlands.
normally maintained a passive role.

Philip, himself,

As more and more

Catholics were executed in England, however, his
hostility increased, and Elizabeth's assurances that
they were condemned for purely political reasons did not
convince him. 24 With Mendoza's expulsion in 1584 AngloSpanish relations were severed. Religion had served to
25
estrange natural allies,
and as Elizabeth became more
openly involved in the Netherlands, a total breach was
imminent.
By the 1580 s
1

the economic foundations of

the Anglo-Spanish alliance had also been eroded.

The

basis of this friendship had always been trade and
English foreign policy was normally concerned with
26
fostering and preserving this traffic.
Traditionally,
most of England's export trade was conducted through
Antwerp in the Spanish Netherlands and was therefore
dependent upon Spanish goodwill.

During the 1560 s,
1

however, when rebellion in the Netherlands brought
continued instability to this area, English merchants
were forced to expand their field of commerce.
24

Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 307.

25 wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation, p. 159.
26 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 281.
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For the next two decades trade was extended
into the Baltic and Mediterranean areas while John Hawkins
embarked on buccaneering ventures.

The use of English ships

was also increased, and they were· transporting almost all
products by the end of Elizabeth's reign. 27 No longer
dependent, therefore, upon Antwerp as a market for her
exports, nor on Hanse merchants to provide much needed
naval stores from the Baltic, Elizabeth's foreign policy
need not necessarily be channelled toward the Spanish
alliance.

Furthermore, Hawkins' intrusions into the
28
Spanish slave trade
and England's contacts with the
hated Turks in the Mediterranean 29 provided little
comfort for Philip's growing anxieties about Elizabeth's
independent policies.
As English merchants ventured farther afield in
English ships Elizabeth reaped a dual benefit.

Added to

increased economic independence was a much-needed
amelioration of English sea power. 30

The military forces

which Elizabeth inherited from her sister were enfeebled
from years of neglect. 31

Faced with heavy debts which

were increased by her Scottish campaign of 1559 - 1560
27

Read, The Tudors, p. 239.

28 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 287.
29 rbid., p. 347.
3 0ibid., p. 348.
31

Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 276.

l3

ar.d French expedition of 1562,

32

Elizabeth was unable

to establish any consistent program of improvement at
the outset of her reign.

Through peace abroad and

economy at home, however, she was able to restore her
financial credit33 and, in the 1570's, was ready to
refurbish her forces.
In 1569 Hawkins had become Cecil's professional
advisor and together they tackled the task of reconstructing
the navy. 34 By improving the design of new ships and
modifying the older ones, their quality and fighting
power was greatly enhanced.

New ships were longer and

narrower allowing more manoeuvrability at sea.

They

were also more heavily gunned to create a formidable
35
fighting force.
Although the actual number of ships
did not increase greatly 36 the small nucleus of the
Royal Navy was supplemented by the formation of the
32 According to Sir John Neale in Elizabeth I:
A Biograph~ Elizabeth's debts amounted to aboutL650,000
by 1564. In addition, he estimates that the Northern
Rebellion would cost her £93,000 and the Irish rebellions
of the 1570's about f500,000.
·
33 weale places the total annual income of the crown
at approximately l250,000. Wernham explains that by reducing
expenditures Elizabeth was able to liquidate her debts by
1575 while still keeping taxation low. By 1584 a £300,000
reserve had been accrued.
34Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 355.
35
Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 342-343.
36

Wernham places the actual number of Royal ships
at twenty-two in 1578 and twenty-five in 1587.
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Royal Naval Reserve.

The widening field of English

commerce had trained a new breed of seamen on voyages to
distant lands and merchant ships and private vessels
37
comprised the bulk of England's navy.
There was much domestic opposition toward any
large scale organization of land forces and their training
and recruitment remained the responsibility of the counties.
English military forces had traditionally been 11 sparingly
used at critical points and crucial moments.

1139

It was

the navy, therefore, that was Elizabeth's first line of
defence.

With its increased efficiency under Hawkins, who

was promoted to treasurer in 1578, it had become a force
capable of defending England from invasion, cutting
Spanish communications with the Netherlands, and
harrying Spain's Atlantic fleet.

40

When war eventually

came, it was able to take on and defeat the greatest
power of the day.

41

*

*

*

Whether queen or minister was responsible for
the great successes of the reign is not at present
a question we can answer, those who should know
come to different conclusions, .... As a team they
37 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 353.
38
Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 341.
39I

41

"d

bi ·, P·

24

·

40

Ibid., p. 343.

Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 295.

38

15
were superb, matching caution for caution,
diplomatic finesse for administrative ability, and
a marvellous capacity for keeping six balls in the
air at once for an equal skill
keeping a dozen
strings from getting entangled.

i2

Three days after Elizabeth's accession Cecil was
appointed her principal secretary and one of history's
most remarkable partnerships was thus established.
Elevated to Lord Burghley in 1571, he remained her
chief advisor until his death in 1598.

Despite many

differences, Cecil and Elizabeth complemented each
other in a way exactly suited to the exploitation of
many difficult situations which had resulted from
several years of bad government. 43
Elizabeth's position naturally made her more
hesitant.

She was the judge while Cecil was the advocate. 44

Yet Cecil was consistently judicial in presenting his
policy, always stating the case from both sides.

In

August, 1559, in a memorandum on the Scottish situation,
even though he favoured aiding the Scots, he presented the
case against it: to aid rebels was against God's law• it was
dangerous; and could possibly unite Spain, France, Rome and
the Emperor against England and Scotland. 45
42

Ibid., p. 263.

43 Ibid.
44
sir John Neale, Queen Elizabeth I: A Biography
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Ltd., 1934),
p. 94.
45
Read, Cecil. p. 149.
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Cecil was decisive in his policy and never
wavered from his purpose, but was always flexible in his
46 El. b h b
· ·
me th o d s o f a tt ain1ng
1"t .
1za et , y con t rast, was
persistently

dilator~

to everyone's exasperation, and changed

her mind frequently. 47

She preferred to rely on her skill

in secret diplomacy while preserving an impression of good
behaviour so as not to violate any treaties. 48 Indeed
she had ample reason to follow this course, for her
genius had been abundantly tested during her sister's
reign and she had every right to be confident in her ability.
Cecil, however, showed no lack of equal ability
in convincing Elizabeth.

By attempting to tone down

religious zeal in Scotland and the Netherlands he
presented issues in the realm of secular politics.

By

using representatives abroad methodically to inform
Elizabeth of every hostile act, especially the French
use of her arms and style which was a particularly
sensitive matter, 49 he was usually able to influence her
more than anyone else.
Indeed, Elizabeth did not lack able ministers, and
the debates which issued forth from the Privy Council
46Ibid., p. 192.
47 Elton, England Under the Tudors, p. 262.
48Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 89.
49
wallace MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan
Regime (Princeton: University Press, 1968), p. 75.
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throughout her reign are evidence that policies were
often keenly contested.

The final decisions, however,

rested with the Queen.

Fluent in several languages she

was able to communicate with ambassadors and her
50
knowledge of foreign affairs was extensive.
Despite
consistent pressure from Walsingham, who became her
secretary in 1571, Elizabeth did not become embroiled in
any major Protestant crusade.

Although her councillors

and Parliament continually tried to arrange her marriage,
she emerged unwed and free from entangling alliances.
The promptitude with which she assumed the
government of the realm when its fortunes were
most critical, the firmness with which she
overcame the difficulties of her position, the
skill with which she held her course, through
the tangled and conflicting interests of
European diplomacy, all show her to have been
possessed, even at the commencement of her rs1gn,
of a rare capacity and an undaunted courage.
The keystone of Elizabeth's success has been
described as her policy of "making fires in her neighbours'
houses."52
Covert interference in the affairs of foreign
states for the purpose of exciting internal
disturbances .... a state, agitated and hampered
at home, would have neither the power nor the
inclination to be troublesome to its neighbours.5 3
50 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 236.
5lc.s.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. viii.
52 Read, Cecil, p. 152.
53
C.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. IV, p. vii.
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Elizabeth needed peace at home in order to cure domestic
ills.

To achieve this she needed to ensure that neither

of her potential European antagonists be given the
opportunity to interfere.

France appeared to offer the

major threat and she concentrated on thwarting French
designs.

Apart from allowing unofficial aid to the

Huguenots in France, she focused on two main areas.
She was determined that France should not exploit
England's back door through Scotland and she was
equally resolved that they should not increase their
strength through annexation of the Netherlands.

The

revolt in the Netherlands, however, could also be
utilized to divert hostile Catholic elements and
prevent their assault on England.

Her skillful

manipulation of events in these two areas enabled her
to maintain the peace necessary for England's
rehabilitation.

19

SGOTLA.ND

CHAPTER ONE
BEING MADE ONE BY AMITY.
Let the two nations, marked out for union by
Providence, language, and geography, come together
as equals under the old indifferent name of Britons,
'in one empire of Great Britain. Then the Scots and
the English, being made one by amity, ... having the
sea for a wall, mutual love for garrison, and God
for defence, should make so noble and well-agreeing
a monarchy that neither in peace we may be ashamed
nor in war afraid of any worldly or foreign power. •l
Somerset's proclamation to the Scottish people
made little impression in the light of his and his
predecessor's policy toward them.

Although Henry VIII

had realized that control of Scotland was crucial for
England's security, the bullying tactics he had used
toward the Scots had served only to alienate them.
Henry's efforts to create an alliance by marrying Mary,
infant Queen of Scots after her father's death in 1542,
to his son, Edward, had met with disaster.

After England's

unpopular invasion and occupation of Scotland in the 1540 1 s
Mary had been hurried off to France where she would
subsequently be married to the Dauphin, Francis.
By 1558, therefore, England's security was
certainly threatened.

Scotland could link the

discontents of the north with those of Ireland, while
1wernham, Before the Armada, p. 172.
20

21

leaving England open to invasion. 2

On November 17, 1558,

Cecil wrote the following memorandum of important matters
to be considered at Elizabeth's accession:
To make a stay of passages to all the ports until
a certain day, and to consider the safety of all
places dangerous in this realm towargs France and
Scotland, especially in this change.
Since England and France were already at war he suspected
that Henry II might be preparing to take advantage of this
back

door~

and his position seemed ominously strong.

Catholic sovereign of England had died and her
half-sister had claimed the throne.

11

The

illegitimate 11

By a coincidence showing

remarkable forethought, France not only had custody of the
11

rightful heir" but had also succeeded in arranging her

marriage to the Dauphin.

Scotland was practically a

French province and surely the "most Catholic king of
Spain" would not prevent a French invasion from Scotland
in order to replace one of questionable faith and birth
with the rightful heir to the English throne, one of the
true religion, Mary Stuart.
These were the complicating factors which plagued
the negotiations at Gateau Cambresis, darkening them
with a shadow of mutual distrust, rancour and
unfulfilled hopes. 4 Peace discussions had begun between
2 Ibid., p. 149.
3

C.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 1.

4 J. B. Black, The Reign of Elizabeth: 1558-1603
(2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 38.
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France and Spain in August 1558 and England had joined
in September.

For Spain, a solid French domain

consisting of France, England, Scotland and Ireland
would have been disastrous to communications with the
Netherlands, and Philip hoped that the new Queen would
continue to follow his lead in the negotiations. 5 The
French set about trying to split England and Spain,
using the Pope's influence in an attempt to assure the
Catholic succession. 6 The beginning of Elizabeth's
reign had coincided with Mary's marriage to Francis and
the ascendancy of the Guise faction in France, leading
to renewed efforts to solidify their control over
Scotland with the hope of claiming her throne.
On 18th November 1558, the English commissioners
at the peace negotiations wrote to the Privy Council
emphasizing the French threat to

11

annoy England by

Scotland which now is ruled much by France."

7

It was

feared that if France attained peace she would
concentrate her efforts on Scotland and her intentions
with the Scottish marriage were well-known.

England,

however, could hardly afford to continue fighting,
especially since it appeared that France and Spain
were rapidly solving their differences and if this
5
6

7

Read, Cecil, p. 124.
Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 38.
C.S.P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 3.
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could be achieved the Anglo-Spanish alliance might cease.
On 20th November 1558, Sir John Mason, a statesman
and diplomat experienced in Anglo-French relations, wrote
to Cecil recommending conclusion of a peace, "neither by
such agreement as we desire, yet by
get. 118

... ,

such as we can

Elizabeth, however, preferred to gamble on

traditional rivalries.

As long as she dared she played

France and Spain against one another hoping to lengthen
the negotiations in order to gain the maximum benefit,
or minimum disgrace for England.

On 23rd November new

instructions were sent to the commissioners.

They were

commanded to stand firm on Calais at all costs but could
use their discretion on other matters.

They were also

encouraged to keep Philip informed and elicit his support
over Calais. 9

The same day an embassy was sent to Spain

to remind Philip of the importance of Calais to his
communications with the Netherlands. 10
At the end of November a two-month ceasefire was
agreed upon while the conference adjourned until
January.

With its resumption the English commissioners

had the following instructions: to conclude peace if
possible; to maintain the amity between England and the
Burgundians; to try to ascertain the final purpose of
France; to keep Philip informed as expedient; and to hold
8

Ibid., p. 6.

lUibid., p. 11.

9 I bi d . , p . 10 .
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out for Calais.

Should the French prove stubborn in the

last point they were to stall negotiations for further
consultation with the Queen. 11 English intelligence
meanwhile reported French efforts to recruit German
mercenaries which, it was presumed, were to be used in
an invasion of England from Scotland . .Alarmed at this
news the ministers advised confirmation of England's
earlier treaties with Spain for greater security. 12
It is clearly seen that the conference at
Gateau

Cambr~sis

although ostensibly to make peace

between France and Spain, had become a theatre in which
the connection between France and Scotland and its
potential danger to England played a key role.

The

success or failure of this role revolved, for the time
being, on a piece of territory controlling the southern
bank of the Straits of Dover, vital to Spanish, French
and English policy.

From the English point of view, they

had controlled Calais for two hundred years with much
pride and national sentiment. 13

It had been a common

practice in peace treaties to return land captured in the
war and since the French could show no reasonable cause
why this should not continue, Calais should be restored.
This was especially true since it was not Elizabeth who
11
l3
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had lost it, nor even she who had begun the war. 14

To the

French, however, Calais was part of the ancient patrimony
of France which had been removed by force and she had
simply taken it back by force in a legitimate war and
with the support of the French Estates. 15
It was obvious to Cecil, and surely to Elizabeth,
that restoration of Calais was not only unlikely, but
impractical . 16 The deadlock, however, was successful in
prolonging the negotiations and enabled Elizabeth to
prove that she held the national honour in high esteem,
thus enhancing her popularity at home.17

Reluctantly

resigning herself to a compromise over Calais, she
eventually moved on to more pertinent matters,
encouraging her commissioners next to have Scotland
included in the peace treaty. 18 The Scots had been
making overtures to England for peace negotiations and
if these could be included in the Treaty of Cateau
Cambr~sis,

any attempted invasion by France via Scotland

would be a violation of that treaty, binding not only
England and Scotland but also France and Spain.
On 2nd April 1559 the treaties between England
14 c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 126.
15
Ibid., p. 127.
16 MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime,
p. 86.

17s1ack, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 36.
18
c. s. P. Foreign Series, Vol. I, p. 150.
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and Scotland, and England and France became final.

There

was to be peace amidst these three countries, none of
whom was to invade the territory or assist the enemies
of another.

Calais was to be ceded to France for eight

years after which it would be either restored to England
or compensated for with a forfeit.
this period, France, England and

For the duration of

were pledged
to make no -hostile acts against one another. 19
Scotlan~

The loss of Calais closed England's door to the
continent and left France free to pursue her Scottish
ambitions. 20 However, Elizabeth could reasonably assume
that Henry II would not immediately risk a new conflict
with Spain by attacking England.

Although Elizabeth had

avoided total dependency on either France or Spain,
Philip was not likely to forget that the alternative to
21
an independent Elizabeth was a French Mary Stuart.
The
conflict was still far from over.

The treaty had left

France surrounded by Hapsburg territory making her
Scottish ties all the more important, 22 and had increased
belief in the possibility of a Catholic crusade.

The

Guise family, the Hapsburgs and the Pope were the chief
19 Ibid., pp. 195-196.
20 Great Britain, Privy Council, Acts of the Privy
Council of England: 1542-1628, Vol. VI (London: 1890-1946,
West Salem, Wisconsin: Microcard Editions, 1966), p. x.
21 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 246.
22
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27
suspects in English eyes.
Although the treaty had officially confirmed
recognition of Elizabeth as England's Queen the barely
latent fears were soon apparent.

On 10th July, 1559,

at a tournament celebrating the new peace, Henry II
was killed.

The young Dauphin became Francis II, a

flexible instrument in the hands of the Guise faction.
Applying pressure through their sister, the Scottish
Queen Mother, and their niece, the Queen of Scots, the
Guises forced Francis to pursue a policy aimed at restoring
and extending French influence in Scotland.

Francis and

Mary began openly to flaunt the arms and style of the
English monarch.
Ten years earlier Henry II had boasted, "France
and Scotland are now one country. 1123 This indeed seemed
true in 1559, however Scotland had begun to question
events which, since the formal transference of the
regency to Mary Guise in 1554, had established French
officials in all important government positions.

It was

feared that Mary Stuart would remain in France and govern
Scotland as a French province.

In religious matters the

growing number of Protestants feared that extermination
24
would be their ultimate fate.
Mary Tudor's rule in
23
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28
England had driven many Protestants northwards and during
the early days of her regency Mary Guise had attempted to
25
maintain their allegiance through compromise.
To
further the alliance between France and Scotland, however,
was now her major aim, and as the reformers became more and
more numerous and demanding, her policy veered from its
middle course.

With Elizabeth's accession she decided

that the days of toleration were over.

In Scotland,

resentment against foreign domination had again aligned
itself with religion.

Just as in 1550 the old alliance

and old faith had identified themselves with national
independence against England, so in 1559 the reformers
were able to make Protestantism a national movement
against French imperialism. 26
By 1558 Scottish national leaders were ready for
action against France.

Thus Elizabeth's accession,

coinciding with more vigorous French policy was of
tremendous importance to the Scottish Protestants who
now felt that they could rely on English support to oust
the French.

Indeed it was in England's national interest

to eliminate French rule in Scotland, as Cecil and
Elizabeth were well aware. 27
25 P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland to the Present
Time, Vol. II (Cambridge: University Press, 1911),p. 37.
26 Dickenson, Scotland from the Earliest Times
to 1603, pp. 319 - 322.
27
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29
After the treaty of Cateau Cambr:sis the regent
received instructions to crush the reform movement.

A

riot broke out in Perth and the armies of the regent and
the congregation faced each other.

The rebellion of the

Scottish reformation had begun.
The few months since Elizabeth s accession had
1

not been spent idly.

Cecil had realized the necessity of

strengthening the defences of England against Scotland
and France and had set to work immediately to equip the
channel squadron and continued the fortification of
28
Berwick.
While favouring peace with France he was also
encouraging attempts to kindle religious controversies
29
there and in Scotland,
and was improving the financial
situation and military supplies in England with the aid
of Thomas Gresham, the royal agent in Antwerp.

Although

Cecil favoured aiding the Scots, his cautious sovereign
was loathe to become involved.

By the treaty of Cateau

Cambr,sis England had pledged not to make war against
France.

England was still in no position to make war, and

Elizabeth, still somewhat insecure on her throne, did not
wish to encourage dissidents in her own realm by aiding
rebels in another.

30

There was yet another reason for her

28 Acts of the Privy Council, Vol. Vtt, p. 4.
29
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holding back.

Earlier she had made it possible for

John Knox to return to Scotland via England assuming that
he would further inspire the reformers, making her aid
unnecessary.

Elizabeth had little time for Knox, in fact

Cecil had to attempt to exclude him altogether in his
negotiations with the Scots for fear that Elizabeth's
anger toward him would cause her to halt even indirect aid.
And yet one must wonder if she was not perhaps enjoying the
irony of the author of the "First Blast of the Trumpet"
begging for help from a woman ruler, and wishing to savour
it to the full.
Cecil had to content himself for the time being
with espionage and harassment of the French in Scotland.
He encouraged those who annoyed the French and advised
holding those captured for questioning "to learne
somewhat that may advaunce the servyce of the Quenes
Maj es ti e . 11 3 1 There were rum o a :rs f r:o m the nor.th of a
possible French invasion against Scotland at Berwick or
somewhere in England. 32
In Scotland, meanwhile, the Protestants had
conducted a successful campaign and captured Edinburgh,
forcing the regent and her French forces to retire to
Leith by September 1559.

A month later they deposed

Mary Guise transferring the government to the Hamilton's
31
32
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31

and the Lords of the Congregation.

The Duke of

Chatelherault and his son the Earl of Arran had joined
the Protestant ranks and, being the next heirs to the
throne after Mary Stuart, had added some legitimacy to
the Protestant cause.

But the Scots had reached the peak

of their military success.

Their army, a band of ill-

trained, undisciplined, country folk, who had come to
battle filled with religious zeal but few more practical
supplies,

33

proved a poor match for the highly trained

and experienced French forces.

It became apparent that

they could not hold out long if aid was not forthcoming.
The Scots had been making overtures to the
English earlier in the year, and in December 1559,
Maitland, a skilful diplomat, was sent by the Scots to
seek open aid from the English.

Elizabeth had been

providing money for the Scots since August described as
"private loans" from Sir Ralph Sadler, one of her chief
advisors on Scottish affairs.

By the end of the year,

however, news of French military preparations alarmed
Cecil who began bringing extreme pressure to bear on
the Queen.

Through a weblike network of collaborators,

Cecil fell back on what was to prove his favourite
device for cajolling action out of his reluctant mistress.
Using her representatives abroad, Sadler and Randolph in
the north, Throckmorton in Paris, and Chaloner in Brussels,
33

Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time,
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32
he made Elizabeth aware of every possible suggestion of
hostility on behalf of the French. 34 He drafted an appeal
for the Lords of the Congregation to send to Elizabeth.
Couched in terms that would appeal to her, it stressed
their loyalty to their true sovereign, but sought
Elizabeth's protection against the French. 35
In November 1559 two events occurred to aid Cecil
in his tactics.

Throckmorton returned from Paris with

news of French religious problems, and the Protestants
suffered a defeat in Scotland.

The pressure had worked

and Elizabeth laid the problem before her council.

Kept

largely in the dark until now, the council was far from
agreeing with Cecil's bold policy.

Their objections were
not aimed at secret subsidies or "strange events at sea, 1136
both of which could be denied, but invasion by land was a
blatantly hostile act, and they doubted even Elizabeth's

ability to deny any involvement in such policy.

The

newer councillors were willing to follow Cecil, but older
members preferred to fall back on the safer Hapsburg
.
37
a 11 1ance.
The main opposition in the council was voiced
by Nicholas Bacon on the following grounds: England
34
35
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lacked the men and money and the Scots were too weak to
expel the French alone;

England was disunited; assisting

rebels against their rightful sovereign was unjust;
France was four times as strong as England; little help
could be hoped for from Spain and only active opposition
from Rome; and it was better to be defensive, than illprepared and offensive.

He advised continuance of secret

aid since the problem was not as imminent as it appeared,
and in a year's time England would be better prepared to
attack the French. 38 About the middle of December
Admiral Winter was instructed to sail for Scotland with
a fleet of fourteen ships and supplies.

He was to

intercept reinforcements from France to Scotland and to
pick a quarrel with the French fleet if possible. 39 If
questioned, however, he was to say that he acted on his
own initiative.
By 24th December, Cecil's victory in the council
. t ervene. 40
ha d been won an d l•t was reso l ve d t o in
Norfolk, who had criticised Cecil earlier, was won over
with a colourful role as the Queen's Lieutenant in the
38
39

Read, Cecil, p. 159.

Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of
State Pa ers, Domestic Series ... 1547-1625, Vol. VI
Washington: Microcard Editions, 1964 , p. 144.
40
Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 93.

34
North. 41

He was instructed to proceed with the utmost

care and invade only when it was clear that the regent
would not negotiate. 42 Toward the end of December he
moved to Newcastle to take charge of the forces there.
On 27th December, Admiral Winter sailed for the Firth of
Forth.

The next day Elizabeth turned down the council's

proposals.

She may have shared Bacon's views and was

aware of the clash in the council.

She was also cautious

over the cost of invasion, and preferred to gamble on her
genius for secret diplomacy.

In matters of war where there
43 Sh
. •t y, El"lza be th pre f erre d.ln d ec1s1on.
..
was no unan1m1
e
also hated aiding rebels, especially those whose
religious inclinations were so strong.

She was aware of

the desirability of destroying French influence in·
Scotland, but reluctant to help.
The Scots and the English did not entirely agree
on the aims of the war.

The Scots wanted to depose the

regent. evacuate the French and set up their own
administrative committee.
England.

The English wanted security for

Only Mary Guise's stubborn refusal to negotiate

or recognize the Anglo-Scottish alliance united the two
into a common cause, to expel the French. 44 In January,
41 MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan

Regime, p. 91.
42
Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 43.
43
Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 94.
44

Black, The Reign of Elizabeth, p. 46.

35

Winter's fleet successfully harassed the French ships in
the Firth of Forth, and Providence seemed now to have
sided with the English.

A French fleet dispatched with

reinforcements for Leith was caught in a storm and the
ships that survived were forced back to the continent.
In February, Elizabeth reluctantly gave Norfolk instructions
to conclude with the Scottish nobles and on the 27th
February a treaty of mutual defence was signed at Berwick.
English aid now became a reality and Elizabeth became the
protector of Scottish civil and religious liberties for
the duration of the marriage of Mary and Francis and one
year thereafter. 45 England was to send an army to Scotland
to help expel the French, to be reciprocated should the
46
French invade England.
Finally, the Scots testified
to their loyalty to their Queen provided she did not
oppress the

11

just and ancient liberties of the kingdom. 11

47

The Privy Council was now encouraging intervention.
In an address to the Queen on 23rd March 1560, Mary and
the Guises were described as mortal enemies and the
councillors claimed that it was "just and honourable for
her to aid the Scots to expel the French forces from
that kingdom. 1148
through May.

Similar communications continued

In April, the English and Scottish forces
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joined, arriving at Leith on 8th of May.

Their siege was

poorly prepared and they lacked adequate equipment.
The garrison, however, received no support from France
and was ultimately forced to surrender. 49
Meanwhile elaborate diplomatic manoeuvres were
taking place between England, Scotland, Spain and the
Netherlands.
conflict, but

Philip II had offered to mediate in the
this suggestion was brought by a

Spanish envoy, Glajon, from the Netherlands, where
commercial interests were pro-English and anti-Spanish.
Philip's offer was for Elizabeth to withdraw, he would
then dispatch a Spanish force to punish the Scottish
rebels with the help of France.

Should France then attempt
to invade England, he would protect Elizabeth. 5
Cecil

°

used this opportunity to alarm the merchants, both in
the Netherlands and England, creating tensions between
the pro-Spanish de Quadra and pro-English Glajon.
Gresham, too, was uttering suggestions that Spanish ships
headed for the Netherlands might possibly be diverted to
51
England instead.
Encouraged, Elizabeth told Norfolk to push forward
and embarked on her own double game, urging secret
negotiations with the regent while applying pressure
49
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through her invading army. 52

In France, too, Throckmorton

had held discussions with the Cardinal of Lorraine and,
finding these unpromising, advised continuance of the
invasion.

A new French ambassador to England sent in

February had confirmed the French determination to
assert the pretentions of Mary Stuart.

53

Philip's

attempts to mediate were met with news that the invasion
was already underway.
The French finally succumbed after two serious
setbacks.

The Tumult of Amboise brought their religious

problems to the fore, and in Scotland, the regent died
in Edinburgh Castle, on 10th June.

All three parties

were now ready to negotiate.
The main object of Mary's regency had been to
promote French ambition in Scotland, and in her
determination to achieve this she was doomed to the same
failure experienced by the English a decade earlier.
Although forceful in her role and not easily defied, she
never fully understood the realm she sought to oppress
under foreign officials.

Her actions transformed the

traditional Scots' suspicion of the English into a dread
of France.

With her appointment to the regency the peak

of French power in Scotland was achieved.

Her demise

symbolized the failure of their aims and the ultimate
52
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success of the Anglo-Scottich alliance.

*

*

*

What shall follow of my going towards Scotland,
I know not, but I fear the success~ the Q's
majesty is so evil disposed to the matter, which
troubleth us all. 4
It was not only Cecil who had misgivings about
leaving the court.

Many wondered who could possiblJ

handle Elizabeth in his absence. but there was also
general consensus that if anyone could negotiate a
successful peace, he could. 55 The discussions were aided
by further events which served to improve the English cause.
A disaster to Phiip's forces at Tripoli made Spanish
mediation, or interference, improbable, and domestic
problems increased in France.
Cecil and Wotton were to handle the negotiations
with Randan and Valence, the two French representatives.
The Scots were not included since the French refused to
treat with the rebels, however the English demands were
largely for the benefit of Scotland as well as England,
and the Scots were satisfied with the promise of a future
treaty with France.
The preliminary instructions were drafted by
Cecil.

Mary and Francis were to abandon the use of the
54
55
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arms and style of England, and recognize Elizabeth's
title.

A11 French troops were to be evacuated, although

here the commissioners were given the right to allow
residual forces to remain after consultation with the
Scots. 56 French fortifications were to be demolished
and the alliance between Elizabeth and the Scottish
Lords was to be recognized.

The elimination of French

officials in the Scottish government was to be
negotiated between France and Scotland.

It was also

suggested that the opportunity might be used to gain
restoration of Calais. 57 The question of religion was
deliberately ignored by Cecil except for a vague clause
concerning freedom of conscience.

He also wanted
confirmation of the treaty of Gateau Cambresis. 58

Cecil

wished for a close association, if not a union between
England and Scotland.
At the preliminary negotiations in Newcastle it
was agreed to transfer the conference to Edinburgh, and
an armistice came into effect on 17th June.

The next day

serious negotiations began.

The first item to be discussed
59
was the usurpation of the arms and style of Eng1and
and
on this point Cecil and Wotton were successful.

Using the

threat of Norfolk's army to "persuade" the French to be
56 c.
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more honest, most of the articles were agreed upon by
23rd June.

The matter of Calais, although the French were

at first reluctant to discuss it, was to be referred to
a new treaty, and the Scots and French were to begin
negotiations about withdrawal of troops and demolition
of French fortifications.
On 6th July, 1560, the Treaty of Edinburgh was
signed.

Cecil had essentially gained all England's

demands.

Conventions in London were to be held to

consider compensation for the French use of the arms
and style of England.

The Scottish government was to

be controlled by a council of twelve, to be selected
by the Queen of Scots and the Lords, thus ousting French
officeholders.

Only on the matter of the Anglo-Scottish

league was Cecil forced to accept an ambiguous statement,
and the Scots would have preferred a more definite
religious policy. 60
The treaty was completed just in time, for three
days later a letter arrived from Elizabeth demanding
that negotiations cease unless Calais be returned and
an indemnity paid.

Fortunately this letter was to be

effective only if negotiations were not already completed.
The Treaty of Edinburgh was undoubtedly one of the
greatest achievements of Elizabeth's reign.

The Franco-

Scottish tie was replaced with an Anglo-Scottish alliance.
60
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Elizabeth had become the protector of a newly Protestant
Scotland, and she could feel safe from French attack from
the north.

French troops were to be withdrawn and she was

to be recognized as the sovereign of England.

The treaty

offset the disaster of Calais and strengthened hopes for
61
Elizabeth's reign.
The eventual success of the
Reformation was now assured in Scotland despite the fact
that religious policy decided upon by the Scottish
Estates was to be submitted to Mary and Francis for
approval.

The treaty was a triumph of prestige and

honour, and England's reputation rose both nationally
.
t•iona 11 y. 62
an d interna

In Scotland, the political victory over the
French was soon transformed into a religious one.

The

Estates, meeting after the treaty, abolished papal
authority, outlawed the mass, and approved the
Protestant Confession of Faith framed by Knox and his
followers. 63 Thus the religious settlement which
confronted Mary on her return to Scotland in 1561, after
the death of her husband, must have been far from
pleasing to the new Queen.

Despite her apparent acceptance

of the situation as she found it, there was little doubt
that her long range policy would include an attempt to
61
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salvage the wreck of the old church and the French
.

a 11 1ance.

64

Suspicion of these intentions was not eased by
Mary's stubborn refusal to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh.
The treaty had called for renunciation of the English
arms and style flaunted by Mary and Francis since
Elizabeth's accession. 65 In ratifying the treaty,
therefore, Mary would be relinquishing her claim to the
throne of England.

Attempts were made to delay her

return to Scotland by refusing to grant a safe conduct
. d in
.
th'is matter. 66
un 1 ess s h e comp l ie

Meanwhile support

in Scotland was rallying around the new Queen.

Young

and attractive, she no longer personified the hated
Guise connection and even the Protestant Anglophile
party in Scotland began to plead for her recognition
at least as Elizabeth's successor.

67

Mary's claim might have been harmless had it not
been for religious complications.

Backed by the Pope,

Philip II and France she offered a potentially
dangerous alternative to Elizabeth who was in no mood
to establish her claim and encourage possible conspiracies
around her.
64
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"will alter many things in Scotland, especially the
progress of religion and the devotion of many towards
herself , 1169 Elizabeth stood her ground. Mary, denied
the safe conduct, was forced to travel direct to Scotland
landing at Leith in August 1561.
The year which followed Mary's return to
Scotland was marked by a definite effort
on her part to get on with her Protestant
subjects and to find a modus vivendi with
her southern neighbour.70
On condition that Mary recognized the authority
of Murray 71 and Maitland she was allowed to continue
the private practice of her religion.

Accordingly, when

choosing her councillors in September 1561 she included
. power. 72
t hose no bl es a 1 rea dy in

Apart f rom a b r1e
. f an d

unsuccessful rebellion by the Huntlys in September 1562,
the first few years after her return were comparatively
tranquil and much time was spent trying to further her
claims to the English succession.

Mary's moderate policies,

however, once more opened the rift between Catholics and
Protestants.

No longer afraid of French domination,

Catholics rallied to the Queen and the fortunes of the
69
70
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Murray was Mary's half-brother, Lord James Stuart,
the illegitimate son of James V. He was created Earl of Mar
in February 1561 and later Earl of Murray or Moray. He
dominated Scottish politics until his assassination in 1570.
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Protestant Lords came to depend on their success or
failure in the succession question. 73
Soon after Mary's arrival, therefore, Maitland
was dispatched to London to resume negotiations.

He

pursued several courses in an effort to accomplish
Mary's recognition.

The Scots offered a compromise:

formal acknowledgement of Elizabeth's title if she would
accept Mary as heir presumptive.

Despite Elizabeth's

assurances that she preferred Mary's claim to all others, 74
it was indeed debatable whether or not Parliament could
have been induced to co-operate.

Mary was very unpopular

in England, especially with Parliament, where she was
75
considered to be French, Guise, and Catholic.
Thus thwarted, Maitland turned to an alternative
scheme.

Convinced that a suitable marriage for Mary

would, in time, bring recognition, he concentrated his
efforts in this area.

For some time there had been talk

of a proposed marriage to Don Carlos, son of Philip II
and Maitland held talks with de Quadra, the Spanish
ambassador, presumably to this end.
Mary's chance was all but gone.

By 1563, however,

Renewed Anglo-French

amity after the Treaty of Troyes denied Mary French
73
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45
support for her suit, and Philip II announced that his
son's madness made the marriage impossible.76
Attempts to arrange a meeting between the two
Queens met with no success and in the autumn of 1563
Elizabeth instructed Randolph, her representative in
Scotland, to explain her position to Mary.

Privately

Elizabeth thought Mary's claim the strongest and had
prevented Parliament from barring her succession
77
altogether in 1562.
Mary's acceptance of Protestantism
as the established religion in England would be essential
if she hoped to become Queen.

A French, Spanish, or

Austrian marriage would make her claim impossible,
however, a suitable match might allow further examination
of her case. 78
It was in this last point that Mary saw her
greatest opportunity, and two possible suitors appeared
to be offered by Elizabeth.

In March 1564 Randolph was

authorized to suggest Lord Robert Dudley,

79

soon to be

created Earl of Leicester, and in September, the Earl of
Lennox was allowed to return to Scotland followed by his
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son, Henry Lord Darnley.BO

It has been suggested that

Elizabeth's intention was to confuse Mary, keeping her
unwed and thus allowing continued excuses for postponing
her recognition.Bl

Mary, however, was tiring of Elizabeth's

procrastination and resolved to pursue her own course.
In July 1565 with her marriage to Darnley she achieved
what has been described as her "one great stroke of
policy. 1182
She triumphed in Scotland; she frightened
Elizabeth; and she became once more an
important personage in the eyes of
continental potentates.83
By her marriage, Mary had merged two claims to
the English succession, 84 and Darnley's English birth
would enable him to inherit the crown.

What a pity that

for all Mary's apparent political genius this "master
stroke" would be transformed into a tragedy which
would in the end cost her her kingdom.
she must pay for her defiance was high.

The price which
She was saddled

with an arrogant, despicable husband whose family was
already embroiled in the clan feuds of Scotland.
80
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Within a month of the marriage Murray had been outlawed
and the Scottish Lords had risen in rebellion.

*

*

*

In April 1565 Murray had withdrawn from the
court joining Argyll and Chatelherault in August.

The

Lords' abortive rebellion, known as the Chaseabout Raid,
lacked any substantial support and by October its
leaders were exiles in England and Mary appeared
triumphant.

It was only natural that renewed instability

in Scotland would invite the interest of foreign powers
and especially close scrutiny from Elizabeth.
The year 1565 showed signs of amity between the
Pope, Philip II and Charles IX all of whom were pledged
to exterminate heresy and restore the unity of Christendom. 85
It appeared that Mary, by ousting her Protestant advisors,
was about to lead the way in their crusade.

Encouraged

by rumours of a Catholic league she appealed to France
and Spain for help, while Murray turned to Elizabeth.
Although undoubtedly it was a major factor in
sixteenth century politics, Elizabeth was convinced
that religion was not all-important in shaping the
. hb ours. 86 Threatened with
.
po 1.lcy o f h er ne1g
f ore1gn
rebellion in the Netherlands and suspicious of French
85 The final session
closed with the appearance
Catholic powers pledged to
86
Read, Walsingham,

of the Council of Trent had
of a united front among the
overthrow Protestantism.
Vol. I, p. 35.
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designs there, Philip, although a fanatical Catholic,
had no desire to increase French influence in Scotland.
France, constantly facing a Huguenot threat at home,
was troubled by the progress of Alva's troops along the
eastern French frontier toward the Netherlands.

Fear of

a conspiracy arising out of a meeting between Catherine de
Medici and Alva at Bayonne resulted in a Huguenot call
to arms, plunging France into her second religious war
in 1567. 87 Since Spain and France, therefore, were too
suspicious to co-operate and afraid to act alone they
confined themselves to a warning that they would help
only if Elizabeth declared war on Mary.

88

Mary's disastrous policies, however, made it
unnecessary for Elizabeth to intervene.

By her promotion

of Catholics and aliens, leading to the murder of Rizzio
in March 1566, she managed to bring about a reconciliation
89
between Protestant and Catholic lords.
Her suspected
involvement in Oarnley's murder and subsequent marriage
to Bothwell denied her of what little support remained.
By July 1567 Mary was a prisoner at Lochleven and the
87

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 294.

88

Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price
Revolution, p. 225.
89

The Protestant Lords Murray, Glencairn and Argyll,
some of whom were implicated in the plot against Rizzio, were
reconciled with the Catholics Bothwell, Huntly and Atholl
who had helped Mary escape after Rizzio's murder. In April
1566 all six were members of Mary's Privy Council.
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Protestant Lords were in control with wide popular
support.

She had been forced to abdicate in favour of

her thirteen-month-old son. James VI, who was a much
more acceptable candidate for the English succession.

90

It appeared that Elizabeth had once again succeeded
through inactivity.
be savoured.

Her triumph, however, would not long

Early in May 1568 Mary escaped from her

gaolers, joined the Hamilton's, and attempted to regain
her throne.

She was soundly defeated at Langside and

fled southward, arriving in England 11 a fugitive and a
suppliant in the kingdom which a few years before she
had so proudly claimed as her own. 1191
Elizabeth faced a dilemma from which the international
situation robbed her of any easy solution.

Deeply

committed to the theory of divine right Elizabeth had
spent the past year attempting to mediate between the
Scottish Lords and their rightful Queen.

It is possible

that with this in mind Mary had thrown herself upon
Elizabeth's mercy genuinely hoping that she would be
restored.

However, for the Protestant Queen of England

to take up arms to restore her Catholic cousin would have
ruined the English party in Scotland whom Elizabeth had
no wish to alienate.
90

Wernham, ed .• The Counter-Reformation and Price
Revolution, p. 229.
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The old spectre of a Catholic conspiracy loomed
large.

The Pope was anxious to restore Mary as the

protector of Roman Catholicism in Scotland and England,
but his forces were limited. 92 Philip II was angered by
Elizabeth's seizure of the Spanish pay ships and
relations with Spain were deteriorating.

93

Yet the greatest

threat appeared to come from France where religious war
might lead to increased Guise influence at court.

Lack

of their traditional Burgundian alliance and loss of
Calais from which to dominate the channel placed
England in a particularly precarious position. 94

It was

perhaps, therefore, to prevent any French interference
that Elizabeth persisted in her bid for Mary's restoration
while allowing her

11

trial

11

to drag on, thus avoiding any

commitment which would have been opposed by the Scottish
Lords.
Although Elizabeth was successful in preventing
any foreign intervention at this stage, her policy was
to have serious consequences in the future.

Deserted by

her allies, Mary would remain in England, a prisoner in
various castles, for the rest of her life.

She would

become the centre of a series of conspiracies to oust
Elizabeth and restore Catholicism in England.
92
93
94
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refraining from a definite verdict regarding Mary's guilt
.
95 .
or 1nnocence,
Just enough doubt remained to keep the
Marian faction alive in Scotland where it continued to
plague the Protestant Lords. 96
With Murray's recognition as Regent in July 1567,
the factious Scottish nobles split once more.

Murray,

representing the English alliance, Protestantism and
recognition of James, was opposed by a Marian faction
refusing to recognize James or the Regent.

While

negotiations for Mary's restoration continued, her
supporters took to arms launching a civil war which would
continue for the next five years.

The Perth Convention,

assembled in July 1569 to discuss the problem of Mary,
did nothing to mitigate her straits, and her attentions
turned toward foreign and Catholic supported plots to
aid her friends in Scotland and place her on the English
throne.
In Scotland, meanwhile, Murray's assassination in
January 1570, followed by Marian raids into northern
England induced Elizabeth to send troops to retaliate
and infused Charles IX with renewed suspicions concerning
her designs.

Despite his initial indignation, however,

relations between France and England were fairly friendly
95
After examining the evidence presented at the
Conferences of York and Westminster the commissioners
alleged that nothing had been proved against either
Mary or Murray.
.96 Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price
Revolution, p. 231.
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and Mary's negotiations with Spain, about which Elizabeth
97
took care to see that Charles was informed,
weakened
her cause at the French court.

After considering an offer

by the Guises to aid Mary at their own expense, Charles
resolved instead to reach an agreement with England on
how the Scottish problem should be settled.
Walsingham at this time was in France to negotiate
an Anglo-French league and inevitably affairs in Scotland
entered into the discussions.

Walsingham suggested that

Charles was afraid to oppose Mary entirely for fear that
she might triumph, gain the throne of England, and unite
with Scotland and Spain against France. 98 Charles
protested against Elizabeth's intention to send troops
warning that he would be forced to help the Marians if
she did.

He also sent an envoy, Du Croc, Guisan in

sympathy, to England, with vague instructions to deal
with the matter of Scotland.

Ultimately, however, the

Scottish settlement in the Treaty of Blois, concluded
19 April 1572, omitted any mention of Mary's welfare
and made provision for Anglo-French co-operation to
99
bring peace to Scotland.
Commissioners from both countries proceeded to
Scotland and managed to arrange an Abstinence in
August 1572 which was extended to the end of the year.
97 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 188.
98
99 Ibid., p. 194.
Ibid., p. 184.
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The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's, however, crushed the
last hopes of the Marians and prodded Elizabeth into a
more severe course of action.

After failing to negotiate
for Mary's execution by the Scots 100 in March 1573 she
dispatched a force under Drury to besiege Edinburgh
Castle, the last Marian stronghold.

The surrender of the

castle in May marked the end of the Marians in Scotland
and henceforth the Scottish problem would revolve not
around the question of Mary's restoration but of
l 0l
controlling James.
If Mary had been of a less sanguine and more
patient nature, if she had ruminated on the
lessons of the past, if instead of being an
inveterate plotter and fluent liar she had
been content with one string to her bow at a
time, if, in short, she had been honest over
these negotiations - then there is scarcely
a doubt that Elizabeth would have restored
her, a crippled Queen maybe, but free and a
Queen. lu~
After July 1567 the main theme running through
all Elizabeth's negotiations with the Scots was a request
for Mary's restoration.

The terms were to be stringent,

demanding Mary's ratification of the Treaty of Edinburgh
end delivery of James as a hostage to be brought up in
England.

As late as February 1571 Elizabeth was still
refusing to recognize James VI as King of Scotland, 103
lOOC. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. X, pp. 523-524.
101 conyers Read, Lord Burghley and Queen Elizabeth
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), p. 108.
102 Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 198.
103 wernham, Before the Armada, p. 309.
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despite much persuasion from the Regent Lennox.

What was

it then which caused her change of heart?
While the Marian faction in Scotland had rebelled
against Murray in 1569 Elizabeth had faced a crisis at
home.

Resentment against her policies and Cecil's

growing influence crystallized around a plot to marry
Mary to Norfolk, bring about her restoration and
re-establish Catholicism in England.

The plot revealed,

Norfolk was arrested and in November the northern
Lords Northumberland and Westmorland rose in rebellion.
Lacking anticipated support from Scotland or Spain the
revolt failed and Marian raids against loyal nobles in
the north provided Elizabeth with an excuse to proceed
against Edinburgh.

The collapse of the insurrection

also revealed that most English Catholics were loyal
subjects, demonstrating the basic stability of Elizabeth's
regime, 104 and diminishing her constant dread of an
English Catholic uprising in favour of Mary Stuart.
Fear of a foreign conspiracy remained, however,
and the events which followed the Northern Rebellion
would reinforce it.

Norfolk, released from the Tower in

August 1570, immediately became embroiled in a second
plot much more dangerous than the first.

His servants

were intercepted carrying money to the Marians and the
Ridolfi Plot was revealed.

This conspiracy called for

Alva to send troops, money and arms from the Netherlands
l0 4 Rea d , Th e T ud ors, p. 178.
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to aid a revolt in England led by Norfolk and his
followers.

Elizabeth was to be siezed, Catholicism

restored, and Mary and Norfolk would rule England and
Scotland. 105 Investigations showed that de Spes, the
Spanish ambassador, was heavily implicated and he was
expelled in December 1571.

Norfolk's arrest and execution

followed, and with the occurrence of St. Bartholomew's
Massacre in France in August, the threat of a Catholic
crusade against England seemed imminent.
In February 1570 Pius V had issued his Bull
Regnans in Excelsis excommunicating Elizabeth and
absolving her subjects from obedience.

Despite apparent
106
annoyance on the part of Philip II and Charles IX
it

was difficult for Elizabeth to believe that the Bull had
107
been published without their consent.
It was a well
known fact that France, especially the Guise faction,
had been sending aid and encouragement to the Marians
at Edinburgh.

The complicity of the French King was

uncertain but there was little doubt that once he had
subdued the Huguenots he would intervene vigourously
in Scotland. 108 It was therefore exped1~nt that
Elizabeth take advantage of French impotence and destroy
109
Mary's cause.
105
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108 Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 128.
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Despite French ambassador Fenelon's protests,
Charles was unable to take any action against Elizabeth.
He was far more concerned about preventing her assistance
to the Huguenots in the religious war which raged in France
11 0
as a result of the massacre.
With the fall of Edinburgh
Castle Mary's cause and that of Catholicism died in
Scotland.

The Regent, Morton, was strongly Protestant

and pro-England.

With Mary's party destroyed as a

fighting force the danger of foreign intervention was
111
diminished.

*

*

*

For the next five years Scotland remained
comparatively calm and during this period relations
with England revolved mainly around the question of
pensions.

Since his appointment as Regent in 1572,

Morton had been asking Elizabeth to enter into a defensive
league with Scotland and to secure support for England
by "judicious distribution of pensions. 11112 This policy,
although supported by most of her councillors, was not
acceptable to the thrifty Elizabeth.
.
h am was warning
.
Wa 1 sing
of

By April 1575,

113
.
.
F renc h ac t•ivity,
·
increasing

possibly in an effort to persuade his reluctant mistress,
llOR ea d , Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 130.
111
ll2Ib"d
Ibid.
l
. ' p . l 31.
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but it appears that Catherine de Medici had managed to
. fl uence came
nourish a French party 114 whose 1n
eventually to be expressed in opposition to Morton.
By autumn Henry Killigrew, one of Elizabeth's
am bass ado rs i n Scot l and, wa s obs er v i ng the de v e l op men t
of a faction of nobles antagonistic to Morton and pleas
for pensions to maintain his influence continued.
Elizabeth, at this stage, preferred to mediate between
the groups and it was not until June 1578, on receiving
news of the Dutch defeat at Gembloux, that she was
prepared to open negotiations for a defensive league.

11 5

It was already too late, however, for in March James VI,
persuaded by Morton's opponents, had assumed the
government in his own hands and called for Morton's
resignation.

Although Mar was able to claim the

guardianship of James and restore Morton by May, his
days were numbered.

The coalition which opposed Morton

was powerful indeed and his pleas for aid to Elizabeth
fell on cautious ears.

It was clear that the two parties

in Scotland were now evenly matched and Elizabeth was
loathe to provide the French with an excuse to become
involved by taking sides herself. 116 She resolved
therefore, to mediate the dispute thus attempting to
maintain the goodwill of both factions.
Some appearance of harmony had been established
114

Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 132f.
l1 5 Ibid . , p . 144.
ll 6 Ibid . , p . 15 3.
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by the end of the year and it seemed that James's
ambition to succeed Elizabeth would be a potent factor
117
in maintaining his co-operation.
A dispute over the
Lennox title and land, however, provided an avenue for
further French intrigue.

The Sieur d'Aubigny, French

claimant to the estates, arrived in Scotland during
the summer of 1579.

He was Catholic, an emissary of

the Guises, and suspected of working in the interests
of Mary Stuart.

He was also handsome, an accomplished
118 He
.
cour t ier
an d an a d ro1·t sc hemer.
re pr esen t e d th e
French alliance and break from England and within a
month he had become a force to be considered in
Scottish politics.
In October 1579, Errington, an agent sent to
Scotland to discover the effect of D'Aubigny's coming,
reported that he was high in favour with James.

119

This

became apparent the following May when he received large
land grants and the Lennox Earldom (elevated to a Dukedom
in 1581).

Allied with Captain James Stewart (created

Earl of Arran in 1581) he would form the focal point
for Guise and Catholic schemes in Scotland for the next
three years.

Walsingham had already begun to

11

smell in

the air some scent of the Guisan and Spanish plots
7
l l I b i d . , p • 1 5 4.
l l 8 I b i d . • p . 1 5 5.

11 9

Ibid.
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against England which were ... developing in Paris."

120

D'Aubigny's ultimate task was to restore Mary Stuart and
Catholicism, his immediate purpose was to discredit Morton.
With the aid of French gold he quickly rallied
the discontented elements and by the end of 1580 was
ready to make his move.

Summoned to appear before the

council, Morton was charged with complicity in the
Darnley murder, convicted.and executed the following
June.

It would seem that D'Aubigny, now in supreme control,

could advance his major policy.

Early in 1580 rumours

abounded of a Guise plot to restore Mary in Scotland and send
1 21
James to France.
The following year Walsingham was
warning of a scheme to invade Scotland supported by the
122
Pope and Philip II.
While in France trying to negotiate
an Anglo-French alliance he wrote:
The Duke of Guise is of late crept into very
inward credit with the King, which ought to
move her Majesty to be more careful of the
matters of Scotland, for that there are
daily consultations in the Duke's house,
especially since advertisements are come
hither out of Scotland that the King doth
submit himself to any such direction as his
mother shall give him, even so far forth as
the yielding up of the g?~3rnment to her if
she shall think it meet.
It appeared certain

that English interests

were seriously threatened, but D'Aubigny's victory was
120
1 21
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not complete.

The scheme to transport James to France

not only aimed to restore Catholicism in Scotland but
124
also at his conversion.
This prospect, together with
increased Jesuit activity in Scotland, alarmed Arran who
began to build a party among the Protestant Lords.
It appeared, too, that James 1 s seeming acquiescence in
his mother s schemes was designed chiefly to gain her
1

support for his recognition as Elizabeth s successor.
1

125

Several possibilities were thus presented to
Elizabeth.

In an attempt to strengthen the Protestant

party she aimed to widen the breach between D1 Aubigny
and Arran.

When evidence of a disagreement appeared

between D1 Aubigny and Mary, Elizabeth chose to play
•
•
h"is mot her. 126 Negotiations
James s f av.our1te
against
I

were reopened with Mary suggesting increased liberty
for her return .for her co-operation against D Aubigny.
1

It was possible that these were designed also to deceive
127
the French, as suggested by the Spanish ambassador.
Finally, Elizabeth never forgot James s major ambition,
1

to be her successor to the crown of England.

She seldom

missed an opportunity to warn him that co-operation
with D1 Aubigny and the French would jeopardize his chances.
While the Jesuits unfolded their plans to restore
124
125
126
127
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Scotland to the Catholic fold, Elizabeth was intriguing
with the Earl of Angus to overthrow D'Aubigny.

Their

designs culminated in the Raid of Ruthven in August 1582,

128

which placed James in the possession of the English
party.

Co-operating with the raiders, James declared

himself a free agent and D'Aubigny was ordered to leave.
Friendly relations with England were restored.
France was not yet ready to concede the victory.
Toward the end of the year two ambassadors were dispatched
to Scotland, Fenelon via England and Maineville direct.
Fenelon was detained in London to await D'Aubigny's
departure.

He proceeded to Scotland accompanied by

William Davison in January 1583.

His instructions were to

free James from his captors, but he arrived to find James
co-operating and the mission appeared fruitless.

However

Maineville, who was backed by the Guises, did manage to
restore some French influence thereby laying the groundwork
129
for James's escape in June.
Since 1580 the Guises had been promoting a scheme
to invade England and Scotland with the support of Philip II
130
and the Pope.
It was to this end that the Jesuits had
been used as messengers from the various parties to
D'Aubigny in Scotland.
128

The plan called for Spanish and

Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time,
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129
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Papal troops aiding D'Aubigny to restore Catholicism in
Scotland as a preliminary to an invasion

Gf

England:

Thwarted by uncertainty on Philip's behalf and delayed
by the Ruthven Raid, these schemes were held in abeyance
until mid-1583 when James's escape activated them once
more.

It was in this phase that Francis Throckmorton

became involved and his capture and subsequent
confessions put an end to the plot.
It was reasonably clear that this scheme had been
131
devised without the compliance of Henry III
and,
apart from the Guise involvement, belongs more in the
realm of Anglo-Spanish than of Anglo-French relations.
Encouraged by his increased strength since acquiring
Portugal, and angered by Elizabeth's involvement in the
Netherlands revolt, it seemed that Philip was merely
biding his time awaiting a suitable excuse to attack
England.

With the dismissal of Mendoza, for his

part in the Throckmorton Plot, relations between England
and Spain appeared doomed.

Threatened by Jesuit advances

in England, revolution in Ireland and open hostility from
Spain, Elizabeth turned in desperation to a renewal of
the French marriage negotiations.

Her greatest fear,

however, was that James was now ready for an association
.
G .
132
with the u1ses~
thus opening, once more, her pastern
131R ea d • Halsingham, Vol. II, p. 375.
132
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gate to foreign invasion.
Three courses were explored by Elizabeth during
the coming months to prevent this misfortune.

First,

James's growing independence offered the possibility of
a humane solution to the problem of his mother.

Believing

in Mary's influence over James, Elizabeth once more
broached the subject of her liberty.

This was to be

granted if James promised to maintain the English alliance
and with suitable guarantees from France.

133

It soon

became apparent, however, that James cared little for
his mother's fate and her persistent scheming made any
settlement along these lines impossible.
Elizabeth therefore contemplated an alternative
plan, to foment rebellion among the Scottish nobles,
some of whom were alarmed at the stand James appeared
.
. .
l 34 An attemp t to remove J ames
t o be ta k ing
on re 1 ig1on.
from Arran's influence by capturing Stirling Castle in
April 1584 was easily reversed, and Arran emerged as the
supreme arbiter of Scottish policy for the following year.
Elizabeth's third possibility was one which
had been contemplated for some time, known as the
"by-course".
133

134

This amounted to an effort to win Arran

Neale, Queen Elizabeth I, p. 269.

The Scottish ministers were attempting to
remove the King's right to interfere in spiritual affairs
by abolishing the office of Bishop. James continued to
insist on his right to appoint Bishops and the "Black Acts"
passed in May 1584 strengthened his authority to their
exasperation.
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over to the English cause and use him to detach James
from Guise influence.

Arran seemed prepared to co-operate

in order to gain Elizabeth's favour and negotiations
took place in August 1584.
Due to the machinations of Patrick, Master of Gray,
relations between England and Scotland were eventually
stabilized.

Originally sent to Scotland by the Guises,

Gray was commissioned by James and Arran in October 1584
to negotiate with England.

1 35

Won over by Walsingham he

became somewhat of a triple agent serving Arran, Mary and
136
Elizabeth.
Within a short space of time it became
clear that Mary's influence in Scotland need no longer be
feared and by the end of 1585 Arran had been ousted.

James,

no longer a mere plaything in the hands of his councillors,
was willing to negotiate a league.
By July 1586, James was an English pensioner
bound to assist Elizabeth if she were attacked and pledged
.
.
137 It was fortunate,
to give
no succour t o h er enemies.
for Walsingham was warning that events (did) "plainly
show that Spain and France run one course against us both
in this and in all other actions. 11138 and with Alenson
gone, Elizabeth was forced finally to play her hand in that
other theatre, the Netherlands.
l 35

Brown, History of Scotland to the Present Time,

Vol. II, p. 156.

136

Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 237.
137
138
Ibid., p. 256.
Ibid., p. 252.

65

THE

c7' Of'

NETH E. R LP\N D-5
p
0

0

G
E

R

M

A
N

.s
T

A

-r
E

s

F~ANC.E

CHAPTER TWO
NO SEMBLANCE OF UNITY.
A land with no semblance of unity in which the
nobility had been quarrelling with the merchants,
the burghers with the artisans, the cities with
the countryside, and the trades with Tach other
for as long as anyone could remember.
The seventeen provinces known as the Spanish
Netherlands, ancient heritage of the Dukes of Burgundy,
were part of the vast empire inherited by Charles V
and bequeathed by him to his son, Philip II.

They

comprised a confusing tangle of political chaos, where
counties, duchies, or cities jealously guarded their
ancient privileges under a recalcitrant native nobility.
Their divisive character was further emphasized by the
absence of any linguistic unity and nurtured by an
intense trade rivalry between the cities.
Traditionally the sovereign had exercised only
limited power in the Netherlands and any centralizing
tendencies had been rigourously opposed.

Thus when the

area was added in 1555 to the realm of the fanatical
political introvert, Philip II, it was inevitable that
these irreconcilable forces would eventually clash.
lCicely V. Wedgwood, William the Silent: William
of Nassau, Prince of Oran e: 1533-1584 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1944 , p. 36.
66
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Philip made little effort to appear as anything other
than a foreigner to the Netherlands.

He was involved

in a war with France which was unpopular with his
subjects. and his repeated demands for subsidies made
it look as if Netherlands' funds were being used to
enhance Spanish power in Europe. 2 His request to the
States General in 1556 was countered with a demand for
removal of Spanish troops and respect for the ancient
liberties and privileges of the Netherlands.
Determined to have his way, Philip embarked on
a policy aimed at eroding these native sources of power.
His Regent. Margaret of Parma. was instructed to consult
only with a three-man inner council, appointed by Philip
and directly under his control.

The nobles thus became

a hollow voice, their advice and pleas unheeded by an
alien absentee ruler.
It was Philip's fanatical Catholicism. however,
which radicalized the opposition and increased the
apprehensions of his subjects.

The persecution in

England under his wife, Mary Tudor, had been observed
with grave foreboding from across the channel where it
was commonly suspected that they were next in line.

3

The established church had sunk to a low level
in the Netherlands during the first half of the sixteenth
century and reform was long overdue.
2

Ibid., p. 37.

3

Charles V, in
Ibid., p. 24.
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attempting to arrest the decay, had introduced the
Inquisition as a mechanism to carry out his proclamations.
The Netherlands. however, with its many commercial
contacts, could not be isolated from the influences of
the Reformation.

Despite a prohibition on Calvin's

works issued in 1550, the end of the war against
France had reopened traffic between the two areas and
brought with it a new flood of Calvinist influence. 4
Thus Philip's determination to strengthen his
ecclesiastical authority, illustrated in his plan to
reorganize the Netherlands bishoprics, crystallized
political and religious opposition into a national
movement.
The revolt which followed found initial
expression in a demand for the withdrawal of Cardinal
Granvelle and restoration of the power of the nobility.
Spearheaded by the Calvinist mob, however, it was
ultimately transformed into a religious struggle which
rent the national movement asunder.

Given the character

of the Netherlands, with its regional jealousies and
endless competition, one must question whether a purely
political rebellion would have been any more effective.
There is little doubt that religious persecution fanned
the smouldering embers of political dissent.

1609

The violent

4
P. Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands: 1555(London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1932), p. 36.
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tactics of the Calvinists, however, alienated many
who had no intention of replacing Catholic tyranny
with Puritan incendiarism.

The end result was far from

William of Orange's ideal of an independent United
Netherlands where freedom of conscience prevailed for
all.

Instead the Netherlands, divided along religious

lines, became a theatre for civil war and foreign
intrigue for almost a century, evolving ultimately
into the separate political entities of Holland,
Belgium and Luxemburg.
The revolt in the Netherlands opened a new
arena to Elizabethan intrigue, but the stage was
cluttered with many complicating factors.

By the mid-

sixteenth century English exports were chiefly in the
form of cloth carried by the Merchant Adventurers and
distributed through Antwerp.

5

Trade was always a major

consideration to Elizabeth and Cecil, and when trouble
seemed imminent they took steps to locate new markets,
but in 1563, when Margaret closed Netherlands ports to
English ships and traders, it appeared that their
prosperity was seriously threatened.

Granvelle, the

author of this policy, was convinced that English
merchants were spreading Protestant ideas, and his.
convictions were supported by Elizabeth's involvement
in the French religious war.
5

7

Read, Cecil, p. 289.

7

6 Ibid., p. 167.
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The ban resulted in retaliation from Elizabeth
and in 1564 the Merchant Adventurers carried their cloth
to Emden.

Although the market was less lucrative than

Antwerp, the- embargo proved more serious for Spain than
for England, and the following year terms were accepted
to resume normal trade.

Although economic relations

remained in a state of flux for another decade, there
was sufficient commerce to ensure that it was a factor
to be considered in Netherlands policy.

No matter how

much she was tempted to keep Philip occupied with
trouble in the Netherlands, Elizabeth was loathe to
allow total chaos to break out and jeopardize her
prosperity.
The revolt also provided Elizabeth with an
opportunity to play on the ancient Hapsburg - Valois
rivalry.

The Treaty of Cateau Cambresis had closed

with an aura of friendship around Spain and France
cemented by the marriage of Philip to Elizabeth of
Valois and leaving England confronted by a formidable
alignment of power on the continent.

By taking sides

with one or the other in the Netherlands, however, and
adding to suspicion about their aims there, she was
able to prevent any joint action against herself.
Elizabeth's policy in the Netherlands often
appeared inconsistent and frequently drove her councillors
to near distraction.

She hated supporting rebels against

their rightful monarch and feared that her involvement
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might advance Mary Stuart's cause at home.

She also

despised being the champion of fanatical Calvinists
even though they provided a buffer for CounterReformation forces yearning for a chance to strike at her.
In the final analysis, however, it was a fear of
France which coerced her into action.

Elizabeth was

always suspicious that France intended to annex the
Netherlands and she was determined to forestall them.
Although she was prepared to suggest joint action,
subsidize French Huguenots and even AlenJon to aid the
rebels, at the least indication that France might be
gaining ground she would side with Philip to prevent
a French takeover.

A French Netherlands would have been

disastrous to England.

Geographically adjacent to one

another as they were, Elizabeth would be unable to
disrupt communications as she could between the
Netherlands and Spain.

If an independent Netherlands,

allied to England through religion and commercial
interests, was to be denied her, there was no doubt
that Elizabeth considered a Spanish Netherlands the
lesser of the two alternative evils.

*

*

*

In 1559 Philip expounded his plan to reorganize
the bishoprics in the Netherlands.

Promulgated by Papal

Bull in 1561 it aimed to reform a corrupt church and
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strengthen the fight against heresy,

8

by creating

new bishoprics and ensuring that rights of appointment
reverted to the crown.

9

It was greeted with a storm of

protest in the Netherlands.

Abbots and nobles saw in it
an attempt to decrease their income and influence. 10
The plan, which had been developed without consulting
the nobility, was being imposed by a foreign King and
it aroused much hatred which came to be directed
against its executors.
Already opposition to Cardinal Granvelle had
stirred in the political sphere due to his dominant
position on Philip's hated council.

Thus, in 1561,

when as Archbishop of Malines and primate of the
Netherlands church he became responsible for carrying
out the King's religious reforms, frustration over
these policies gathered against him.
The opposing forces, however, were plagued with
internal dissentions.

The leading nobles who objected to

infringement of their privileges were William of Orange and
the Counts of Egmont and Hoorn.

There were those, however,

such as Aerschot, who remained loyal to Philip thus
providing him with an excuse for intrigue.
8

H. G. Koenigsberger and G. L. Moss, Europe in the
Sixteenth Century (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1968), p. 256.
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Supporting one or other faction were several members of
the greater or lesser nobility representing every shade
11
of opinion from radical Calvinist to loyal Catholic.
It was therefore impossible to achieve any consistent
policy or maintain a united front against Philip.
Embassies dispatched to Madrid in the early 1560's
failed to convince Philip to alter his policies.

In

November 1565, the Segovia letters brought his reply.
Sterner repression was to be applied.

It was obvious

that Philip intended to ignore advice and persist in his
hated course in the face of all opposition.

The nobles

who had attempted to work within the government now
withdrew, joining the more radical lower nobility in a
league to protest Philip's policies.
Calling for abolition of the Inquisition and
moderation of the edicts against heretics the league
drew up a position to be presented to Margaret.
Although it appeared that national consciousness was
finally breaking through the shell of noble rivalries, 12
it was not a truly united nobility which confronted the
Regent.

Nevertheless, a moderation of religious policy

suspended the hated edicts and an Accord was reached
with Margaret pending a reply from Philip.
There was confusion, however, as to exactly
11 Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 52.
12

Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, p. 89.

74
what had been granted by the Accord.

Protestant refugees,

considering the edicts abolished, returned from exile and
public preaching started.

13

Incidents of image-breaking

and mob violence occurred, originating in Antwerp and
spreading elsewhere, throughout 1566.

Frightened by

this fierce emergence of Calvinism, Catholics and
moderates rallied to support Margaret, who now emerged
.

as protectress o f c h urc1I an d society.

14

William of Orange still hoped to steer a middle
course and therefore ignored the pleas for help from the
Calvinists.

Instead he Jssisted Margaret in her efforts
to keep the peace. 15 After her siege of Valenciennes in

December and annihilation of rebel forces, Margaret was
charged with having broken the Accord.

The rift among

the nobles was by now clearly visible.

Egmont and Hoorn

joined the court party to carry out Margaret's policies.
Others took to arms with the rebels.

William, denounced

as a traitor, withdrew to Dillenburg where he hoped to
muster aid from Germany to pursue his moderate aims.
In August 1567 Philip's reply arrived.

Spanish troops

had been dispatched under the Duke of Alva.

Their

mission was to carry out vengeance on the Netherlands. 16
3
l _l_.'
Ib.d
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Alva came not only to visit the evil-doers
with merciless retribution and wipe out the
last vestiges of sedition and heresy, but to
destroy the ancient privileges of the country,
the root of all the evil, and to raise up on
the site thus cleared and levelled the straight,
symmetrical 19ifice of absolutism, the ideal of
t h_ e ne w a g e .
Following the abortive revolt of 1567 most of the
leaders of the opposition to Philip had left the
Netherlands and those remaining showed much readiness
to accept his new representative. 18 Egmont and Hoorn,
together with Aerschot and other loyal Catholics, had
taken the new oath of loyalty required by Margaret in
February.

Alva, however. was determined that there

should be no misconception about his task.

Immediately

on his arrival he arrested Egmont, Hoorn, and all others
suspected of complicity in the uprising. Establishing the
19
Council of Blood
to condemn wrongdoers he embarked on
a campaign of terror which so cowed the people of the
Netherlands that no town dared rise to aid their liberator
when William invaded in 1568.
11

20

Never was nation subjected to a reign of terror

with more calculated deliberation or more systematic

persistence~ 21
17

Within a short period Alva's authority

Ibid., p. 100.

1_8 _;.Ib;__i_d., p. 99.

19

The Council of Troubles, called the Council of
Blood by the Netherlanders, consisted of three members,
all Spaniards, under Alva's chairmanship. It became the
highest organ of government after its establishment in 1567.
20

Wernham. ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price
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was firmly established and the fate of the Netherlands
appeared to be sealed.

William's invasion was afflicted

from the start with many problems:

Although mercenaries

were plentiful he had been unable to coax any substantial
aid out of the German Lutherans.

With the Netherlands

successfully intimidated few of his countrymen dared
contribute to his campaign.
Despite initial successes by his brother, Louis
22
of Nassau,
William was unable to pursue his advantage
and mount a major campaign.

He was subjected to a

waiting game by Alva who chose to observe rather than
engage the rebels.

William's limited funds were finally

exhausted and his bands of unpaid mercenaries were
unleashed upon the countryside.

The "liberators" began

to appear little better than the Spaniards.

William,

fleeing from his own army, joined forces with the
Huguenots who were about to embark on their third
. .
.
F
re 1 ig1ous
war in
ranee. 2 3
Disaster for William, however, did not immediately
mean triumph for Alva.

Ironically the Spanish commander

would soon be faced with the same problem of how to pay
his troops.

Since he lacked the machinery with which to

raise taxes he was forced either to summon the States
General or rely on funds from Spain.

Shipments from Spain

were subject to the uncertainties of passage through the
22 Louis had invaded from East Friesland in April
1568 and defeated the Spanish at Heiligerlee.
23 Geyl, :he Revo 1 t of the Netherlands, p. 107.
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channel where pirates abounded and the weather was
treacherous.

In November 1568, therefore, when a

combination of these dangers scared a fleet of Spanish
ships into Plymouth and Southampton, "divine Providence"
and the Queen of England united to strike a serious blow.
For some time relations between Spain and England
had been deteriorating.

Basic differences in religion
. r1va
. l ry l e d inev1ta
.
. bl y to d.ispu t es 24 b ut
an d economic
Elizabeth's fear of France had curbed her hostility and
forced her to maintain a pretence of Anglo-Spanish
friendship.

By 1568, however, she was less apprehensive.

The continual problem of religious war in France had
reduced her activity in international affairs.

Also,

in June 1568 a suggestion had been made to bring about
a match between the Duke of Anjou, brother of the French
King, and Elizabeth.

This offered an alternative to the

Hapsburg match with the Archduke Charles, for which
25
negotiations had recently been discontinued.
In the
anticipation, therefore, of an Anglo-French alliance
Elizabeth was prepared to follow a bolder policy toward
Spain.
In December she impounded the Spanish pay fleet
and made arrangements with the Genoese bankers to have
their !85,000 loan destined for Alva's army, transferred
24
25
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to her.

26

Seizure of property and reprisals followed,

suspending trade between England and the Netherlands
once more, but it soon became obvious that Elizabeth
was getting the best of the situation.

The Merchant

Adventurers had been reorganized under a new charter in
27
1567
and were able to sell their cloth at Hamburg.
The trade stoppage was ruinous to

N~therlands

and Spanish

merchants, however, and by March 1569 Alva had no
alternative but to impose taxes in order to pay his army.

28

The States General was summoned to approve his Tenth
Penny Tax. 29 Angry over the loss of English trade and
reluctant to finance their own demise the States
refused his request for the tax but agreed to a grant
instead.

Alva's tax was shelved until 1572 allowing the

rebels time to consolidate their forces.

Although the

revolt, for the moment, was confined to the piratical
escapades of the Sea Beggars, Alva's financial policy
had served to stimulate a significant opposition
element in the Netherlands.
Commissioned by William to sail for the Principality
of Orange, the unpredictable gang known as the Sea Beggars
had, with Louis of Nassau's aid, established its headquarters
at La Rochelle. 3
From this base it ravaged channel shipping,

°
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especially Spanish, with the support of the French
Huguenots and connivance of England. 31 The stubborn
persistence of this unruly band would eventually
contribute much to the success of the revolt.

For the

present time, however, it roamed the channel, plundering
ships and coastal towns indiscriminately, its major
contribution being in the form of booty to bolster
William's treasury.32
William and Louis, meanwhile, encouraged by the
signs of resistance to Alva's tax, turned their attention
to recruiting outside aid.

Although William never

altogether relinquished his hope of getting help from the
German Protestant States, their efforts now focused on
England and France.
The arrival of Alva in the Netherlands with the
main Spanish army was alarming to both France and
England.

Elizabeth had been frightened by Spanish

involvement in the Northern Rebellion and their new
33
ambassador, de Spes, did little to calm her fears.
Elizabeth's council had begun to urge English
intervention in the Netherlands. 34 The outbreak of
religious war in France made French interference impossible
and augmented the pressure on England.
31 Acts of the Privy Council, Vol VIII, p. viii.
32
Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 116.
33 de Spes was advising Spain to pursue an aggressive
anti-English policy including seizure of ships and goods.
34 Wernham, ed., The Counter-Reformation and Price
Revolution, p. 232.
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After the Peace of St. Germaine in August 1570,
however, the Huguenot party, led by Coligny, was increasing
in favour at the French court.

It was at this stage that

a scheme for joint Anglo-French action was first considered.
The plan called for an alliance of France, German
Protestants, and England, together with the Dutch rebels,
against Spain.

Having driven the Spaniards out, the

Netherlands would be apportioned among the participants.
Flanders and Artois would go to France, Holland and
Zeeland to England, and Brabant, Guelders and Luxemburg
to become German States ruled by William of Orange. 35
Although the French council approved of the idea
it advised Charles to be sure of English and French
co-operation before taking any action.

Elizabeth, as

always, remained cautious, declining to commit herself
to an invasion with a partner whose goodwill was
normally suspect.

In spite of the fact that Walsingham

was negotiating to bring about a defensive alliance
and relations between England and France were ostensibly
friendly, Elizabeth could not ignore the unsettled
domestic state of France.

Even when Huguenot influence

was ascendant. encouraging policies pleasing to England,
there was always the realization that the Guises lurked
in the background.

With the Northern Rebellion and

Ridolfi Plot fresh in their memories, few Englishmen
could doubt what policy would be pursued should the
35 Read, Burghley, p. 59.
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domestic pendulum of France swing once mor.e.
Elizabeth was not inclined to support France in
her suspected ambition of gaining a foothold as a
preliminary to taking over the Netherlands.

She

therefore gave only evasive answers to Charles IX and
the invasion scheme foundered.

Efforts to continue the

revolt in the Netherlands reverted back to local forces.
In February 1572, however, the reluctant Queen unwittingly
precipitated its next phase.

As part of a campaign being

waged against channel piracy she warned de la Marek,
captain of the Sea Beggars at that time sheltering in
English ports, to make preparations to withdraw.

On

March 1 a proclamation was issued ordering "all
freebooters of any nation to depart on penalty of
confiscation and imprisonment. 1136 On leaving England
the Sea Beggars proceeded to the Netherlands where they
seized Brill and Flushing and raised the standard of
revolt on dry land.
It has been suggested that Elizabeth, despite
her impending alliance with France was still not anxious
for a complete rupture with Spain and was therefore
willing to expel the Spanish rebels from her ports.

37

It was one of the paradoxes of Elizabethan foreign
policy that such actions, while camouflaged with good
intentions. often accomplished something other than their
36 Ibid .• p. 72.
37
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stated purpose, while leaving Elizabeth absolved from
all blame.

*

*

*

The seizure of Brill and Flushing sparked
another invasion of the Netherlands by William and his
followers in mid-1572.

This campaign relied heavily on

aid from the Huguenots and fell victim with them to the
St. Bartholomew's massacre in August.

Coligny•s favour

at the French court had come to depend on the success
of his expedition to the Netherlands.

Catherine de

Medici distrusted his policy since she had no desire to
tackle Spain alone.

When the expedition met with disaster

at Mons the fate of the French invasion was sealed
.
.
38
along with that of its instigator.
While France once
more fell victim to religious strife William was left
to continue the struggle against Spain.

Despite continued

negotiations with Catherine de Medici who showed some
willingness to aid the rebels, France remained a
shackled ally in the facQ of domestic disturbances.
In England, France was still considered an
unpredictable threat in spite of her fetters, and most
of Elizabeth's involvement in the Netherlands was
designed to undermine French influence.

Only one month

after France and England were joined in a defensive
alliance under the Treaty of Blois a band of English
38
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volunteers, under Sir Humphrey Gilbert, had been
dispatched to the Netherlands.

Their instructions

clearly illustrate Elizabeth s attitude.
1

Anxious lest

the Huguenot expedition prove too successful she told
him to bring Englishmen in the Netherlands under stricter
39
discipline and keep the French out of Flushing.
If it appear that the Duke is not able to
defend his master's countries from the French
and that the French begin to possess any part
of them, and especially the maritime parts,
then it is like that the French, increasing
their dominance, may be too potent neighbours
for us and therefore (it) may be good for us
to use all the means that may conveniently
be, to stay that course.40
Burghley's memorial written in June 1572 exemplifies
England s priorities.
1

Despite pleas from Walsingham and

others for open intervention Elizabeth's policy was
41
evident. She did not object to English volunteers
going over tn help the rebels but she would not risk
open war with Spain.

In her eyes it was imperative for

England's safety that Spain be maintained as a counterpoise to France.

She hoped that the Netherlands would

manage to regain their ancient liberties alone, but if
aid became essential, and France looked too successful,
42
she would help Philip defend his inheritance.
39

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 321.

40 Read, Burghley, p. 74.
41 The French ambassador estimated that there were
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Netherlands in May 1572.
42
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The St. Bartholomew's Massacre confirmed Elizabeth's
worst fears about France and almost immediately she began
to pave the way for a reconciliation with Spain.

The

Treaty of Blois had made provision for the transfer of
the English cloth trade, which had been disrupted since
Elizabeth's seizure of the Spanish loan, to France.
The idea was never very popular with English merchants
who felt that French instability precluded any permanent
43
.
In June 1572, therefore, when Alva
tra d e relations.
suggested negotiations to settle differences, Elizabeth
was receptive, and the next few years showed a marked
improvement in Anglo-Spanish friendship.
A preliminary accord was reached in March 1573
when the Convention of Nymwegen re-established commercial
relations between England and the Spanish Netherlands.
Further negotiations culminated in the Convention of
Bristol the following year.

These agreements settled

accounts about the seizures and counter-seizures of
1568-1569 and led to promises that neither party would
harbour rebels against the other.

They also advocated

.
.
.
.
.
stricter
measures against
privateering
in
t h e channe 1 . 44

Trade, no sooner restored with Spain, was disrupted
again, this time by the Dutch.

With the aid of the

Sea Beggars and taking advantage of mutinies in the
43 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 193.
44
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Spanish army, William had been able to consolidate his
position in the north sustaining the revolt in Holland
and Zeeland from whence he controlled traffic to and
from Antwerp.

Frustrated by Elizabeth's refusal to help

his cause he began to restrict English shipping.
Negotiations with the Merchant Adventurers led to
continued trade in return for a war loan to William,
but Elizabeth was infuriated and ordered seizure of
45
Dutch ships in England.
Thus angered by the rebels,
Elizabeth now confined her official policy to efforts
at mediation between Philip and his subjects.

In 1574,

therefore. when events in France once more entered into
consideration, Elizabeth was on friendly terms with
Spain but almost in a state of war with the Dutch.
In May Charles IX died and Henry III became King
of France.

Eli2abeth suspected that this would lead

to promotion of the Guises and she took care to maintain
contacts with the opposition forces.

The situation in

France offered new opportunities to Elizabeth and her
pol i c i es a t ·,th i s s tag e fores had ow those to be ·u s e d i n
the Netherlands for some years to come.
At the death of Charles IX and accession of his
brother Henry, Francis, Duke of Alenlon became heir
presumptive to the French throne.
45
46

46

Fearing Alenion's

Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 330.

At this time Francis also received the title
of Duke of Anjou, however he will continue to be
referred to as Alen5on for the remainder of this paper.
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close ties with the Huguenots, Catherine de Medici
kept him virtually a prisoner at the French court.
47
Henry's unfriendly attitude,
meanwhile, emphasized
the Guise threat and Elizabeth began to explore various
means to foster the discontent in France.
with the idea of freeing

Alen~on

While toying

to join the Huguenots,

she was also negotiating with Count Palatine to raise
money in Germany for their cause.
Catherine de Medici saw the Netherlands as a
useful outlet for the militant activities of the
Huguenots.

48

When

Alen~on

escaped in September 1575

this prospect became even more attractive offering the
possibility of removing the King's troublesome brother
by establishing him as their protector following
William's suggestion.

Since this policy would undoubtedly

worsen her relations with Spain, Catherine was reluctant
to allow a breach with England to develop.

The Treaty of

Blois was therefore renewed re-establishing Anglo-French
49
cordiality on the surface.
Elizabeth was not averse to a show of French
friendship.

Alva had been replaced in 1573 by a new

governor in the Netherlands, Don Luis de Requesens.
47
English merchants were hampered in France, and
the question of Mary Stuart was reopened by the French
ambassador in London. This normally indicated that Anglofrench relations were somewhat strained.
48

Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 150.
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At last Spain appeared to be making progress.

Requesens

lifted the hated taxes and abolished the Council of Blood
thus managing to undermine William s efforts to win
1

support from within the Netherlands.

In the spring of

1575 he opened negotiations with Holland and Zeeland
while making one last desperate effort to crush the revolt.
His success apparently assured, Philip was no longer
interested in Elizabeth s offers of mediation and her
1

envoy, Henry Cobham, who had been sent to Spain for
this purpose, returned in January 1576 complaining of
51
a cool reception.
If Elizabeth were to force Requesens
into accepting her offer, she would have to make a show
of Anglo-French solidarity.
William, meanwhile, was desperately trying to
persuade one or other of these possible allies to come
to his aid, but by now he was convinced that he could
hope for more from France than from England.

Negotiations

had been carried on somewhat erratically with Alen~on
52
ever since 1573.
Robert Beale, who was sent to
discuss the trade dispute with the Netherlands in 1576,
reported that William had turned toward France and paid
no account to England. 53 Elizabeth warned William that
50
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she would side with Spain if he persisted in his proFrench course.

At the same time, however, she managed

to confuse an envoy from Requesens enough to convince
him that she would aid the rebels if Philip refused to
54
come to terms with them.
All along Elizabeth was
actually investigating a third possibility.

Realizing

that Henry III was in no rush to launch an invasion
into the Netherlands led by his intractable younger
brother3 Elizabeth began to see Alen5on as a possible
55 Th
. .
escape f rom her perp 1 ex1t1es.
e o ld cour t s h"1p
which had been shelved for a while was revived and in
February 1576 Thomas Randolph was dispatched to France.
His mission was two-fold: to convince Henry that any
project of his against the Netherlands would force her
to ally with Philip; and to tell

Alen~on

that she

might lend him aid if he proceeded, under Elizabeth's
56
guidance, against Spain in the Netherlands.
Although
this mission came to nothing, it showed clearly the
course which Elizabeth's future policy was to follow.
Events in the Netherlands forestalled any
immediate action.

In March Requesens died leaving an

unpaid and mutinous Spanish army roaming the countryside
and terrorizing the people of the Netherlands.

Where

a truce with Spain had previously seemed possible,
54
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the provinces now looked toward Holland and Zeeland
for leadership, and negotiations were opened to bring
.

a b out a un1on.

57

In the face of disagreements from

both sides the "Spanish Fury" at Antwerp served to
convince the delegates who decided to pool their
resources to expel the rapacious troops. 58 In
November the Pacification of Ghent was signed uniting
Holland and Zeeland with the other provinces.

Thus when

the new governor, Don John, arrived, he was confronted
with an entirely new situation.

*

*

*

The apparent unity which faced Don John as he
approached the Netherlands was not as solid as it
seemed.

The Pacification had been hastily formed in

the face of a common danger, and the only definite
policy to which the union was committed was expulsion of
59
the Spanish troops.
Peace was establisb~d
- . ..
. ....
- b~tw~~n
.. ·- - .

~.

~

Holland and Zeeland and the other provinces and William
was restored to the Stadholderships he had occupied
prior to Alva's arrival, but disputed matters were to
be referred to an assembly of the Estates of all the
provinces. 60 Many points, therefore, were left unresolved,
57
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notably the question of religion.
Although the Pacification continued to acknowledge
Philip as sovereign, it refused to admit Don John
unless confirmed by him.

Arriving with neither troops

nor money Don John had little choice but to negotiate.

61

In February 1577, in the Perpetual Edict, he ratified
the Pacification and promised to dismiss the Spanish
troops.

The States General. however, in accepting this

agreement, omitted to refer it to William.

Since it

included a clause to maintain Catholicism in the
Netherlands it was evident that he could not acquiesce.
The very fact that the States were even in a position
to bargain with Don John was due largely to the Calvinists
whose tenacity in Holland and Zeeland had enabled William
to succeed there.

It was impossible for him to accept a

settlement that did not guarantee their faith.

The

religious issue would continue to plague the Netherlands
until their ultimate division in 1579 into the Unions
of Arras and Utrecht, but for the moment a facade of
conciliation was maintained in the face of renewed
hostility.
While the nobles wrangled over the Perpetual
Edict Don John, impatient at the obstruction of his
greater purpose,
61
62

62

amassed the remains of the Spanish

.
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army and seized Namur.

63

By his action he hoped to

lure away William's shaky Catholic support but the
effect was the opposite.

Instead it greatly increased

William's credibility and enhanced his popular following
while the disparaged Catholic nobles were plunged
into confusion.
Faced once more with the prospect of war with
Spain William, struggling to keep his forces together
at home, embarked again on his quest for foreign aid.
In seeking a protector for the Netherlands two possible
candidates were being considered.

William was still

convinced that France offered the greatest hope and
negotiations were reopened with

Alen~on.

This policy,

however, was unpopular in the Netherlands where it was
commonly suspected that France had greater ambitions
and that the Guises were intriguing with Don John who
had retreated to Luxemburg. 64 The Catholic party in
the States, now known as the Malcontents and led by
Aerschot, entered instead into an agreement with
Matthias, the brother of the Emperor. 65
Matthias was declared Governor of the Netherlands
in December 1577.

The agreement placed the main authority

of the government in a council to be chosen by the States
6 3c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. XII, p. 36.
64
wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 185.
65
c. S. P. Foreign Series, Vol. XII, p. xvi.
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and was designed to diminish William's influence.

66

Dissention continued, however, and he was able to
circumvent their aims by reducing Matthias to a mere
figurehead who yielded to William's guidance in all
67
matters.
Philip, meanwhile, regarding the appointment of
Matthias as an act of rebellion, sent the Spanish army
back to the Netherlands under Alexander Farnese, Prince
of Parma. 68 Matthias's arrival coincided with a severe
defeat of the Netherlands forces at Gembloux as Don
John began a systematic reconquest of the rebellious
provinces.
William's hope that Matthias would bring aid from
his brother, Emperor Rudolph, proved false, and the
States, now in a desperate position, were persuaded
to treat once more with

Alen~on.

69

The terms of the

agreement reached in August 1578 illustrated the deep
distrust that was still felt towards him.

He was

accepted only as an ally with no share in the government
and no guarantees of sovereignty.

He could conquer lands

east of the Meuse where his campaign against Spain was
66
67
68
69

Wedgwood, William the Silent, p. 181.
Ibid., p. 186.
Wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 331-332.
Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 386.
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to be confined.

70

To further emphasize the suspicion,

yet another possible protector was being considered.
The Calvinists, who were especially powerful at Ghent,
had been intriguing with Duke John Casimir as an
71
alternative to Alen5on.
By October, when Don John
died and was succeeded by Parma, a state of civil war
existed among the rebels.
The problem of religion which had complicated the
revolt from the beginning, now surfaced and irreparably
altered the character of the rebellion.

The Netherlands

as a whole was still predominantly Catholic but
Calvinism was strong in the north and powerful among
the working class in the south especially in the cities.
Although William had tried valiantly to nullify the
religious issue and keep the dispute within the realm
of politics, he had been forced to rely more and more
on the Calvinists and his idea of liberty of conscience
for all was far ahead of its time.

Efforts to reach a

religious peace were sabotaged on both sides and by the
beginning of 1579 the provinces were divided into the
73
Catholic and Protestant Unions of Arras and Utrecht.
With the reconciliation of the former with Philip and
70
71

72

Ibid., p. 400.
Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 10.
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Parma in June the revolt was henceforth confined to
the northern provinces.

In 1581 they renounced their
74
allegiance in the Act of Abjuration.
The rebellion was
now definitely anti-Catholic.

*

*

*

Don John's arrival in the Netherlands in 1576
was to have been prefatory to a much more ambitious
project known as the "Enterprise of England.

11

His plan,

having pacified the Netherlands, was to invade England
and release and marry Mary Stuart so that they might
75
restore Catholicism there together.
It was in
Elizabeth's interests, therefore, that the Netherlands
should not be too easily subdued.

She was well aware

of his schemes and began to feel that her involvement
might be essential, but the divisions among the rebel
leaders made it difficult for her to decide exactly
where to lend her support.
She was uncertain as to the extent of Alen5on s
1

support in France and her first instinct was to warn
Don John that therein lay his greatest danger.

Advising

him to make peace with the States she stressed that she
would tolerate neither Spanish oppression nor French
76
involvement in the Netherlands.
She assured him of
74

Koenigsberger and Moss, Europe in the Sixteenth
Century, p. 263.
75
Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 330.
76 Read, Walsingham, Vol. I, p. 344.
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her goodwill toward Philip but explained that she
could not ignore affairs of the channel seaboard
especially if it appeared that France might triumph
77
through her apathy.
With the Perpetual Edict concluded and in the
expectation of peace in France Elizabeth became more
receptive to pleas for aid from William and the States.
A loan had been sent in December 1576 and more had been
78
promised
but the squabbling States seemed a poor
investment to a parsimonious Queen and she preferred
to subsidize Casimir's exploits as an alternative to
Alenson.

79

It seemed that she was already too late,

however, for Alenson was already involved in
negotiations with the States which would culminate in
the treaty of August 1578, naming him defender of their
liberties.
Always able to see an alternative when faced
with apparent calamity, Elizabeth was not at a loss.
She had been assured by Alenson that he was entirely
at her disposal in the Netherlands.

In May 1578 she

therefore dispatched Cobham to France to renew the
marriage negotiations.

In June, he and Walsingham
80
proceeded on an embassy to the Netherlands.
77
78
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The Alen3on marriage negotiations and WalsinghamCobham embassy are two episodes which serve to demonstrate
the vacillations of Elizabethan foreign policy which
caused such exasperation to her councillors and
frustrated her friends and enemies alike.

Yet in the

end Elizabeth usually accomplished her purpose.
Elizabeth never revealed her very considerable
diplomatic talents to greater advantage than
in her most amorous discourses .... in that
very form of diplomacy in which she was most
at home, not only her neighbours, but even her 81
intimate and trusted advisers were most at sea.
Whether Elizabeth was ever serious about marriage
is still a matter of conjecture.

It obviously was to

her councillors, too, as Walsingham observes:
I do conceive that it was really intended by
the FRENCH, and by the chief of the ENGLISH
Councel, except Leicester ... but for her own
Mind, what that really was, I must leave, as
a thing doubly inscr~~able, both as she was
a Woman and a Queen.
The negotiations for the Alenjon marriage, which had
originated when Walsingham was trying to bring about
the Treaty of Blois, were still going on a decade
later when he was again in Paris attempting to conclude
another league.

Hampered by vague and often contradictory

instructions and constant fluctuations in his mistress's
apparent policy, he complained:
81

Read, Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 4.
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... when her Majesty is pressed to marry, thus
she seemeth to affect a league, and when a league
is yielded to, then she liketh better of a
marriage. And when thereupon she is moved to
assent to marriage, then hath she recourse to
the league; when the motion for the league, or
any request is made for money, then her Majesty
returneth to the marriage.BJ
Elizabeth's policy between 1578 - 1584 is
confusing in retrospect and must have driven those
expected to give advice and carry it out to near
distraction.

Certain clearly defined threads do emerge,

however, through the intricate warp and weft of its
fabric.
As always, the consideration which took precedence
over all others was to avoid French annexation of the
Netherlands.

Thus we see Walsingham and Cobham, at the

outset of their mission, instructed to find out what
the French were planning and use personal persuasion
84
to stop their schemes.
In an effort to discredit
Alen5on, of whose fidelity Elizabeth was never quite
certain, they were to warn the States to limit the
force he was to bring and make sure he would not be
85
powerful enough to rule them.
As Alen5on 1 s agreement with the States in 1578
became an accomplished fact, and as she grew more
certain that he acted without the backing of the
83
84
85
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French crown, Elizabeth became more and more convinced
that through the marriage negotiations she might
influence him to become her instrument in the Netherlands.
Pleas from her ambassadors to aid the States before the
French moved in now brought forth rebukes from their
86
mistress, 1eaving Walsingham and Cobham bewildered
while Elizabeth resorted to her favourite game of
courtship.
By 1580 Elizabeth's policy toward France had
shifted slightly.

Faced with the increasing power of

Spain after Philip's acquisition of Portugal, she
appeared now to favour joint Anglo-French intervention
in the Netherlands and Walsingham was again dispatched
87
to France to seek an alliance.
At this stage it
would seem that she was trying to create a picture
of Anglo-French solidarity in order to prevent any
action against herself from Philip.

Elizab~th

was now

prepared to countenance and even elicit Henry Ill's
support of his brother in the Netherlands.

88

This

prospect had been dreaded by her two years earlier.
Although dual involvement was advocated, it was suspected
by those who had been dealing with Elizabeth for many
years, that she would not be averse to emphasizing
86
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Alenfon's role as being French and thus precipitate
a war between her two rivals.
preferred to marry

Alen~on

Catherine de Medici much

to Elizabeth, thus transferring

him and the responsibility for his escapades to
England. 89 Unable, therefore, to outwit the French
Elizabeth resigned herself to subsidizing

Alen~on

enough

to make him a nuisance to Philip but not to ensure his
. 90
.
h er into
.
. h s pain.
success or b ring
war wit
Since the idea of French annexation of the
Netherlands was so abhorrent to Elizabeth it appears
that she would, as a last resort, have helped Philip
regain control had this seemed inevitable.

She

preferred, however, a retention of Spanish sovereignty
limited by recognition of the ancient privileges of
the Netherlands.

Thus Walsingham and Cobham were to

urge Don John to accept the terms of the Pacification
. h ts. 91
. h guaran t ee d th ese rig
o f Gh en t wh ic
Eager to remain on good terms with Philip,
Elizabeth was careful to disguise her involvement in
the Netherlands as an effort to help protect his
inheritance from France. 92 At the same time, however,
89
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100
she did not hesitate to show fresh ardour in the
marriage negotiations and threaten alliance with France
if Philip appeared to be contemplating involvement in
any of the numerous anti-English activities being
93
instigated by the Guises and the Pope.
She also
threatened to side with the States if Don John proved
94
unreasonable or sought aid from the Guises.
In attempting to unravel this web of perplexity,
Walsingham and Cobham had additional problems with
which to contend.

It was established from past

experience that Elizabeth hated helping rebels and
the Dutch were particularly loathsome to her.
incessant bickering annoyed her and she

Their

de~pised

being

heralded as the Protestant champion of a Calvinist mob.
Annoyed over William's trade embargo and his determination
to seek aid in France she was irascible when confronted
95
with pleas for funds.
She also saw no reason why she
should lend money without excellent guarantees for
repayment, when she considered the Netherlands well
able to finance a much greater portion of their own
revolt.

96

The attitude of the French throughout this
93
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..period is fairly straightforward.
domestic unrest in which

Alen~on

Plagued with
was taking part, they

were eager to get rid of him by encouraging his involvement
in the Netherlands.

They wanted him married to Elizabeth

so that responsibility for his anti-Spanish activities
97
would be transferred to her.
They were not keen for
his campaign to be too successful since this might
98
enhance the position of the Huguenots in FrancP.
and
they determined not to aid him openly for fear of war
with Spain.
But what of Alen5on?

For six years he had

become the shuttle which would weave this fabric on
the loom of European politics.

Whose was the controlling

hand and whose the grand design?
Elizabeth, despite her very considerable ability
to shape events, was never entirely certain that she
had control.

Although Alen5on had assured her that he

was entirely at her devotion, she always suspected that
he, too, was using the marriage negotiations to further
his own aims.

Walsingham was instructed to find out

"the very secret of his mind and disposition in these
affairs. 1199
As usual, her suspicions were correct.

What

97
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102
Alen3on lacked in ability was more than compensated
by his very considerable personal ambition.

It was

obvious that he intended to be no-one's tool in the
100
N~therlands.
As their plight became more desperate
he pressed for more concessions from the rebels.
Negotiating first with the States and later with
William after 1579, by the Treaty of Plessis le Tours
signed in September 1580 he was finally recognized as
sovereign, albeit with certain restrictions against
his absolute power.

l 0l

Realizing that the prospect of his marrying
Elizabeth would greatly enhance his position, he was
prepared to play her game.

At the same time, however,

he was bargaining with his brother to try to obtain
the financial support necessary for a successful campaign.
Offering his services to end the latest of France's
interminable religious wars, he managed to extract
a promise of aid from Henry for his Netherlands
.
102
ventures in return.
Alenson was not above plotting with Parma and
even Ph l.,.ip 103 and when all else failed he launched an
abortive coup against the States in an effort to gain
lOOR ea d , Walsingham, Vol . I I , p . 107.
l 0l
Wedgwood, William the Silent, p . 215.
102R ea d , Walsingham, Vol . I I , p . 44.
103
Wedgwood, William the Silent~ p . 240.

103
control of the major cities as a preliminary to taking
l 04
over the whole country.
The "Folly of Antwerp" in
January 1583 sealed his fate in the Netherlands and he
retired to France where he died the following year.
With the assassination of William of Orange on July 10th
1584 Elizabeth's policy of fighting Philip by proxy in
the Netherlands came to an end.

She must now commit

herself or be faced with "the triumphant power of Spain. 11105
104R ea d , Walsingham, Vol. II, p. 107.
105
Ibid., p. 117.

CONCLUSION
HER HAND FIRM AND STRONG.
It was a strange circumstance that by pursuing
policies basically designed to obstruct France, Elizabeth
would ultimately find herself at war with Spain.

After

twenty years of peace she was finally forced, in
December 1585, to dispatch an expedition under Leicester
to the Netherlands.

Despite the failure of this expedition

open hostility between Spain and England was now an
established fact and it would intensify until its
culmination in the Spanish Armada of 1588With the death of
had opened in

Alen~on

A~glo-French

in 1584 a new chapter

relations.

As long as Henry III

remained childless, which seemed likely, Henry of
1
The prospect of
Navarre was now heir to the throne.
a Huguenot succession was unacceptable to the Guise
faction who set about trying to establish a Catholic
2
They were supported in this effort
succession instead.
by Philip who was afraid that Henry might accept an
offer of sovereignty from the Netherlands.

Philip and

the Guises entered into the secret Treaty of Joinville
1
Appendix B.
2

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 368.
104

105
in December 1584 which aimed to prevent the Navarre
.
3
succession.

Many of the points at issue between England and
France had by now lost their significance.

Scotland was

committed to the English alliance, Mary Stuart had
turned to Spain and ceased to be of interest to the
4
French crown, and in refusing their offer of sovereignty
in February 1585, Henry no longer presented a threat
in the Netherlands.

As France plunged into a war over

the succession in which Philip was deeply involved, it
became obvious that Spain was now the one to be feared.
If he and the Guises were successful in France Philip
would achieve Spanish domination of Europe which
would seriously threaten England.
The acquisition of Portugal in 1581 had resulted
in an alarming increase of Spanish strength.

5

Attempts

to engineer joint Anglo-French aid for Don Antonio had
never materialized and the addition of the Portuguese
navy to the Spanish fleet made Philip's strength most
formidable.

A pro-Spanish succession in France would have

cemented his control on the continent and enabled Parma,
now showing increasing success in the Netherlands, to
3
J. H. Elliott, Europe Divided: 1559 - 1598
(Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 308.
4
Read, The Tudors, p. 181.
5

Wernham, Before the Armada, p. 356.
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invade England.

6

The combined Spanish -

Gui~e~des~gns

for plots against Elizabeth were well known and she could
no longer rely on unofficial interference to prevent
disaster.
In August 1585, therefore, by the Treaty of
Nonsuch, Elizabeth took the Dutch under her protection.
England's years of peace thus came to an end.

It was

fortunate that Elizabeth's preparation for this day had
been thorough.

She had secured her postern gate by

alliance with James which considerably reduced the
threat of foreign invasion from Scotland.

She had

strengthened her forces and restored her economy and
was no longer dependent upon foreign allies.

She had

nourished Hapsburg - Valois rivalry and neutralized
the possibility of a Franco-Spanish crusade against
England.

Finally, by fostering discontent against both

monarchs she had thwarted their individual designs
against her.
As political. economic and ideological differences
finally merged into one general struggle between Spain
7
and England it was certain that Elizabeth had indeed
shunned the rocks and shoals.

She had achieved her

independence, and guided the argosy of England to a
new position of predominance on the waters of the world.
6

Elliott, Europe Divided, pp. 310 - 311.

7
Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 167.
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